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ABSTRACT 
In February 1997 Elias J gave a judgement holding that: "qualified privilege 
attaches to political discussion communicated to the general public." Without 
doubt this decision signals what may be one of the most significant changes to the 
law of defamation in modem times. Media interests have naturally welcomed the 
decision in Lange v Atkinson & ACP and most academic commentary on the 
decision has been in support of the proposed changes. The purpose of this paper is 
to critically analyse the judgement, challenging the outcome and the way that 
outcome was arrived at. 
This paper sets the scene for a consideration of Lange by discussing some of the 
practical issues of the dynamic between freedom of political discussion and 
protection of reputation. The leading New Zealand precedent cases dealing with 
political discussion and qualified privilege are then considered. Against this 
background the proposed expansion of qualified privilege is critiqued. The key 
conclusions are: that Lange is inconsistent with and not distinguished from the 
binding precedents, the scope of the proposed defence is too broad, the reasons 
given for changing the law do not stand up to scrutiny, and that the type of 
proposed expansion of qualified privilege is a matter of policy for the legislature 
not the courts. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 16,529 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In October 1995 Australian Consolidated Press NZ Limited ("ACP") published in its 
North and South magazine article written by Mr Joe Atkinson criticising the 
performance and leadership of Mr David Lange during his time as Prime Minister. Mr 
Lange issued defamation proceedings in respect of 16 passages in the article alleging 
conveyed meanings to the effect that, inter alia, Mr Lange was irresponsible, dishonest, 
insincere, manipulative and lazy. 1 
In 1994 the High Court of Australia in the decisions of Theophanous v Herald & Weekly 
Times2 and Stephens v West Australian Newspaper Ltd3 created a new stand alone 
defence to defamation, holding that "political discussion" was protected in Australia by 
a constitutional freedom found to be implicit in the concept of representative 
government. It was also held that in Australia such occasions as gave rise to the stand 
alone defence would also be occasions of qualified privilege. 
The circumstances of Lange v Atkinson and ACP ("Lange") presented an opportunity 
for ACP to plead the stand alone and expanded qualified privilege defences. ACP's 
chances of success were significantly improved when defence counsel objected to the 
allocation of Anderson J as trial judge and Elias J was assigned to the case.4 
1 Attached as Annexure A is a copy of the North & South article. The passages complained of are 
underlined. 
2 (1994) 182 CLR 104; 124 ALR I 
3 (1994) 182CLR211; 124ALR80 
4 Justice Anderson being a senior High Court Judge experienced in defamation trials who in Television 
New Zealand Ltd v Quinn [ I 995] 3 NZLR 2 I 6 had favoured status quo in terms of the balance struck 
between freedom of speech and protection of reputation, rather than accepting the defence' s arguments 
that the chilling effect defamation laws have on freedom of speech required that the balance should be 
readjusted in favour of freedom of speech. Justice Elias, being a relatively recent appointment to the 
bench, had no experience of defamation litigation and, as the case proved to be, would be more 
responsive to the defences arguments couched in terms of enhancing freedom of speech and the functions 
of electors in the democratic process. For a discussion of the relevance of judge's differing views 
regarding the value of freedom of speech and protection ofreputation see S Penlington "Interlocutory 
Injunctions in Defamation Actions and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" (1995) 7 AULR 347, 
353. 
2 
Although the stand alone defence was rejected Elias J made the following unequivocal 
findings: 5 
I am of the view that it is for 'the common convenience and welfare' of New Zealand 
society that the common law defence of qualified privilege should apply to claims for 
damages for defamation arising out of political discussion. 
Qualified privilege attaches to political discussion communicated to the general public. 
At least one commentator6 has queried whether the decision in Lange goes far enough 
toward protecting freedom of political speech. However, I suggest that such an analysis 
fails to properly comprehend the truly radical nature of the outcome in Lange. It is 
radical in its departure from the principles of long established precedents, and it is 
radical in terms of the proposed scope of the defence, indeed it is more radical than the 
Australian defence. It is with respect that I suggest that in making such a significant 
change to the law of defamation Elias J exceeded the legitimate judicial mandate to 
develop the common law, and in any event the reasons given for making such a change 
do stand up to critical scrutiny. 
This paper will first consider the background to the context in which Lange was 
decided, discussing some non-"qualified privilege" issues before looking at the New 
Zealand precedent cases dealing with freedom of political discussion. Some attention 
will then be given to the principles governing judicial development of the law, with 
particular reference to the application of those principles recently by the Court of 
Appeal in R v Hine 1• The scope of the defence "tentatively" outlined in Lange will be 
critiqued before analysing Elias J' s reasons for creating this very significant new 
category of qualified privilege. Finally, the recent decisions of the High Court of 
Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)8 and Paterson J of the 
5 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22, 46 and 51 . 
6 G Huscroft "David Lange and the Law of Defamation" [1997] NZLJ 112. 
7 Unreported, 15 August 1997, Court of Appeal, CA 465/96. 
8 Unreported, 8 July 1997, High Court of Australia, FC 97 /02 l. 
... 
3 
New Zealand High Court in Harrison v Ban'ks and the Northern Publishing Co. Ltcf 
considered. 
II DEFAMATION AND POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN NEW ZEALAND -
SETTING THE SCENE 
A Some Non-"Qualified Privilege" Issues/or Preliminary Consideration 
1 Massey v The New Zealand Times Company16 - Defamation recognises that 
politicians should have thicker hides 
On 3 December 1910 The New Zealand Times 11 published a cartoon lampooning Mr 
Massey, who was at the time leader of the parliamentary opposition party. Recently 
there had been allegations that Mr Massey had been associated with the distribution in 
Auckland, Wellington and elsewhere of a scurrilous pamphlet reflecting on the Prime 
Minister. Two days before the cartoon appeared, the New Zealand Times had published 
an article exonerating Mr Massey and the Opposition from any connection with the 
distribution of the pamphlet. 
The defamatory meanings pleaded by Mr Massey as flowing from the cartoon were that 
he was responsible for the free distribution of the pamphlet, or had taken part in such 
distribution, and that he had been guilty of a mean and despicable act, and was a liar. 
The newspaper denied the alleged meanings. The jury found: 12 
1. We are of the opinion that the figure [hitching up the wagon] represents Mr Massey. 
2. We are of opinion that this is a political cartoon pure and simple, and is not libellous. 
9 Unreported, 22 August 1997, High Court, Whangarei Registry, CP 14/93. 
10 (1911)31 NZLR929 
11 A copy of the cartoon is attached as Annexure B. It is interesting to note that in the same edition of The 
New Zealand Times (Wellington, New Zealand, 3 December 1910) at page 3 the paper greeted the 
eMctment of the Libel Act 1910: "It enlarges the area of privilege necessary to true freedom of the press 
to almost the same extent that is allowed in nearly every other country of the Empire. It deals with 'chain' 
actions in such a way as to prevent them from being gold mines to the unprincipled ... Had the area of 
privilege been extended to public meetings, and had there been a provision to for the right to fight 
unscrupulous blackmailers by demanding security for costs, the Bill would have been nearly perfect." 
12 Above n JO, 931 . 
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Mr Massey applied unsuccessfully to the High Court, then the Court of Appeal, to have 
the jury's verdict set aside and a retrial ordered. In the Court of Appeal Williams J 
expressed the view that: 13 
Public men and public parties are liable to severe criticism ... that the cartoon was a 
political cartoon no doubt abusing Mr Massey and his party and holding them up to 
ridicule, but within the wide limits of criticism allowable in the case of public men and 
public matters ..... . The jury are as well able to decided whether and how far the alleged 
libel would, in the opinion of an ordinary man, affect the personal character of the 
plaintiff as the most learned Judge or the most acute logician. 
Williams J referred to the English case of Odger v Mortimer 14 where the newspaper had 
characterised Mr Odger as "a demagogue of the lowest type, half booby and half 
humbug, a political cheap-jack who would be a political sharper if he had brains 
enough." . Also in the newspaper there appeared a statement purporting to be signed by 
Mr Odger stating: "I have any quantity of bottled-up abuse, treason, and riot. I will 
exchange the whole lot for any permanent appointment with £250 per annum and 
upwards - George Odger". Williams J observed that: 15 
If Mr Odger had been a private person and not a public man there can be no doubt that 
the statements would have been defamatory and libellous ..... . the question in that case 
was, was the alleged libel really a malignant attack on Mr Odger's private character, or 
was it a holding-up of his principles to derision? 
Rosemary Tobin has suggested that in Massey there can be seen "an embryonic 
Theophanous defence ...... With the positive recognition now accorded free speech in the 
Bill of Rights it may now be time to expand Massey into a common law Theophanous 
defence of qualified privilege covering, at least, matters of political discussion."16 With 
respect, this analysis of Massey is wrong. Massey did not concern defences to 
13 Above n 10, 946 and 952. 
14 28 L.T. 472. 
15 Above n 10, 946. 
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defamation, the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of whether or not the publication 
was defamatory per se. 
It is important to consider the basic building blocks of a defamation action concerning 
political discussion before weighing issues of qualified privilege. First, the jury or the 
judge, must find that the statement complained about is defamatory of the plaintiff. Not 
all unproved criticisms of politicians will be found to be defamatory. As Massey 
illustrates, the threshold for politicians and those in public life may well be considered 
by a jury or judge to be considerably higher than for a private individuals. Alternatively 
this distinction may manifest itself in a lower award of damages than might otherwise 
have been awarded to a purely private plaintiff. Support for this second proposition is 
revealed in a comparison of five recent defamation awards. 
In Shadbolt v Independent News Media (Auckland) Limited,11 Weepu v Greymouth 
Evening Star Company Limited, 18 and Harrison v Banks,19 the plaintiffs were to 
differing degrees public figures who had all been harshly defamed20 in respect of their 
performance of their official duties. These plaintiffs were award $50,000, $50,000 and 
$60,000 respectively. In McRea v Australian Consolidated Press, and Quinn v TVNZ 
the juries awarded the essentially private plaintiffs total damages of $375,000 and $1.5 
million respectively. 21 Although both these awards were very high by New Zealand's 
standards and they were both subsequently reduced.22 These cases support the 
proposition that the chilling effect defamation is significantly less frosty toward public 
discussion of politicians and holders of public office than private individuals. 
16R Tobin Defamation of Politicians, Public Bodies and Officials: Should Derbyshire and Theophanous 
Apply in New Zealand? (1995] NZLJ 90,102. 
17 High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 207/95, Tompkins J, 7 February 1997. 
18 High Court, Greymouth Registry, CP 4/91, Tipping J, 19 March 1997. 
19 Above n 9. 
20 All had been publicly accused of acting dishonestly and illegally for personal gain. 
21 See Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn [ 19%] 3 NZLR 24 CA (refers to jury awards in both the 
McRea and Quinn cases). 
22 In McRea the jury awarded $375,000. The defendant applied to have the award set aside. During the 
course of arguing that application the parties negotiated a settlement whereby Toni McRea would receive 
$100,000 plus payment of her legal fees. In Quinn the jury awarded $400,000 and $1 .1 million on the 
two causes of action sued upon. Television New Zealand applied to have the awards set aside, Anderson J 
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2 Further practical issues tempering the chilling effect of potential defamation 
actions in the political arena 
Costs are an issue significantly tempering the chilling effects of the threat of defamation 
proceedings. Although defamation is often called the plaintiff's tort, the label the 
plaintiff's financial millstone might be more apt. Defamation actions are very expensive 
to prosecute. Details of plaintiffs' costs are difficult to obtain, however I understand that 
Noel Harrison' s23 legal fees had exceeded $250,000 before the three week jury trial in 
Whangarei had commenced. It is rumoured that in Quinn the plaintiff's total legal costs 
exceeded $300,000. It was recently reported that M.P. Tuku Morgan had incurred legal 
fees in the vicinity of $100,000 yet the proceeding against M.P. Trevor Mallard, 
Television New Zealand Limited and Television Three Limited seem to be a very long 
way from being set down for hearing. The decision to prosecute a defamation action 
may mean plaintiffs must commit and risk their financial security.24 Even wealthy 
defamation plaintiffs may be seriously deterred form pursuing this type of litigation, 
particularly where the ultimate award of damages may not come close to the actual costs 
of the proceedings, moreso the case with public figure plaintiffs where ultimate 
damages are likely to be at the lower end of the range of awards. 
In the USA there may be a highly skilled bar readily waiting to accept instructions and 
vigorously prosecute defamation proceedings on a contingency-fee basis. The New 
Zealand bar does not have a strong tradition of contingency-fee arrangements25 • The 
level of damages awarded , while seeming to be slowly increasing , coupled with the 
uncertainties associated with defamation litigation, has not encouraged the emergence of 
a contingency-fee based practice in New Zealand. Unless a defamation plaintiff can find 
able counsel willing to accept instructions on a contingency basis, or it is one of those 
set aside the award of $1.1 million but allowed the award of $400,000 to stand. The appeal to the Court 
of Appeal was unsuccessful. 
23 Above n 9. 
24 In Morgan v Mallard & Ors the plaintiff's mother-in-law pledged the equity in her home in response to 
the first defendant's application against the plaintiff for security for costs. See "Morgan uses relative' s 
home as court security" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 26 June 1997, 1. 
25 See R Fowler and P Connor "Contingency fees: a time for sunlight?" (1997) 253 Council Brief 1. 
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rare occasions where legal aid will be granted,26 I suggest that the financial burden of 
prosecuting defamation proceedings will deter many would-be public figure defamation 
plaintiffs. 
In addition to the issue of costs, a further deterrence factor against the commencement 
of defamation proceedings which experienced defamation practitioners will emphasise 
in the strongest terms at the outset are the personal and emotional costs to a plaintiff in 
pursuing defamation litigation. The lead up to trial may involve years of interlocutory 
manoeuvring, well resourced media defendants may attempt to burn- off plaintiffs 
during the pre-trial stages. Although all civil litigation has risks associated with it, 
defamation proceedings are perhaps the most fraught with uncertainties, especially 
where juries are involved. Invariably the trial of a defamation proceeding will be one of 
the most gruelling experiences of a plaintiffs life, often more traumatic in emotional 
terms, win or lose, than the publication of the statements sued upon.27 Although it is the 
defendant which is strictly speaking on trial, it is very much the plaintiff who is under 
the jury's scrutiny, especially where the defences of truth and honest opinion are 
pleaded. 
The issue of costs, both financial and personal, of pursuing defamation litigation, 
coupled with pragmatic and fair legal advise to most of the large media organisations, 
has resulted in a defacto operation of the media defence proposed by the McKay 
Committee28 but not incorporated into the Defamation Act 1992. For example, where a 
newspaper has published what is clearly a defamatory statement to which none of the 
recognised defences apply, the most common outcome is the immediate publication of a 
correction and apology, and a contribution to the complainant's legal fees, which at that 
stage do not usually exceed $1 ,500. Key factors in counsel so often recommending this 
course of action to potential plaintiffs are the costs and risks of pursuing the litigation. 
The media cooperate because legally they are seriously exposed. It is interesting to 
26 It seems that very few public figure type plaintiffs will be eligible for legal aid. Noel Harrison was 
granted legal aid after he had exhausted all his personal resources pursuing his claim against Mr Banks 
and the Northern Advocate. 
27 These comments are based upon the observations of leading defamation lawyer Peter McKnight. 
28 See Recommendations on the Law of Defamation: Report of the Committee on Defamation 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1977). 
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ponder how this dynamic equilibrium will be effected by the decision in Lange, will the 
comfort of robust defence lead to the media being less accommodating?. 
Setting the scene for a discussion of qualified privilege also requires a consideration of 
the context in which arguments of qualified privilege arise. Unlike the defences of 
truth and honest opinion, qualified privilege protects untrue statements of fact which 
have damaged a person's reputation. What has been said has been published as a 
statement of fact, not as a statement of opinion. It has been published as a statement of 
fact where the publisher cannot or will not by admissible evidence prove the truth of 
what has been stated as being the truth. As Michael Reed QC an experienced 
defamation trial lawyer has put it, privilege protects the "telling of lies".29 It 1s 
significant that true statements and honest opinions are always protected even if 
publication is to the world at large, whereas the occasions are rare where publications of 
defamatory statements to the world at large are protected by qualified privilege.30 
Qualified privilege has developed as the courts have been called upon to identify 
occasions where "the common convenience and welfare of society"31 deems that as 
between the maker of a defamatory statement and the recipient there has been a 
sufficiently strong corresponding interest and duty that, in the absence of malice on the 
part of the maker of the statement, the making of a false statement should be protected 
from defamation liability. As it is a false statement which is being protected the size of 
the audience to which publication is made is important, the larger the audience to whom 
the false publication is to be made the greater should be the weight of the interest or 
duty which justifies the publication. 
29 At a lunchtime debate hosted by the Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 22 April 1997. 
The debate was chaired by recently retired Court of Appeal judge and recognised authority in the field of 
defamation Justice Ian McKay. The topic of the debate was along the lines of whether the decision in 
Lange should signal the future direction for the defence of qualified privilege. Arguing for the affirmative 
were Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Geoff McLay, for the negative were Michael Reed QC and Hart Schwartz. 
At the end of the debate a vote was put to the audience of several hundred, an overwhelming majority 
supported the negative side's position that Lange should not indicate the future direction for qualified 
privilege. 
30 Adam v Ward [l 917] AC 309. See also section 18(1) of the Defamation Act 1992 which states that a 
publication of a report or other matter specified in Part II of the First Schedule of the Act will not be 
protected unless "the report or matter is a matter of public interest in any place where the publication 
occurs " ( emphasis added). 
31 ToogoodvSpyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181,193, 149 ER 1044,1050. 
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Once the important distinction between protection defamatory statements which can be 
proved true or which are stated as genuine opinions and defamatory statements which 
are untrue, is fully appreciated it is not difficult to understand the history of judicial 
reluctance to extend qualified privilege to defamatory statements published to the world 
at large. It is also evident in the cases which are discussed below that questions of the 
importance of freedom of speech and the integrity of the democratic process have been 
seriously weighed when judges have made their decisions. 
B The New Zealand Precedents - Political Discussion and Qualified Privilege 
1 Bradney v Virtue31 
Mr Bradney had been a candidate in an election to the Auckland Harbour Board. He lost 
the election by one vote and subsequently applied to have the election upset on grounds 
of various alleged irregularities. There was a magisterial inquiry at which Mr Bradney 
gave evidence under oath. The outcome of the inquiry was that the election was declared 
void and a new election ordered. Mr Bradney was voted onto the Harbour Board at the 
second election. 
Messrs Keen, Geddis and Weston were not themselves electors in the second election, 
but were all involved in promoting Mr Bradney. Prior to the second election the 
defendant, Mr Virtue, defamed Mr Bradney by saying to Messrs Keen, Geddis and 
Weston that in the course of the magisterial inquiry Mr Bradney had committed perjury. 
The jury found awarded damages of £25 on each of two causes of action, there was no 
finding of malice against Mr Virtue. Edwards J was required to decide whether qualified 
privilege applied to the occasion of the publication. 
Had Messrs Keen, Geddis and Weston been electors Edwards J would have held that 
this would have given rise to a "special interest in the election which upon that ground 
32 (1909) 28 NZLR 828. 
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would make the occasion a privileged occasion within the authorities".33 However, 
finding that the facts of the case did not fit squarely within the authorities Williams J 
went on to consider whether Mr Virtue had been under a moral or social duty to act as 
he did. 
Edwards J adopted the definition of moral or social duty given by Lindley L.J. in 
Bradney v Virtue,34 then considered the facts of the case relevant to such a duty and 
held:35 
It is of the highest importance that none but persons of good character should be 
elected to public offices. To that end it appears to me that if a reputable citizen honestly 
believes that he knows that a candidate for a public office has committed a serious 
offence which in the opinion of reputable persons would be a disqualification for such 
office, that citizen is under a moral duty to society to communicate the facts as he 
believes them to exist to those who are actively promoting the candidature of the 
person whom he believes to have committed the offence ....... The result may be a 
hardship to the plaintiff - the application of the law with reference to this ground of 
privilege has frequently caused hardships; but the principle is for the public welfare, 
and private interests must be subordinated to that. 
Although perhaps not discussed using modern terminology, in the judicial reasoning in 
Bradney v Virtue can be seen a weighing the right to reputation against the competing 
considerations of freedom of speech and proper operation of the democratic process. 
Edwards J made the judgement that protection of defamatory statements made to a 
limited audience who had an immediate interest in the subject matter would properly 
serve the democratic process. 
2 Truth (NZ)Ltd v Hollowa/6 
33 Above n 32, 836. 
34 [1891) 2 Q.B. 350 
35 Above n 32, 839. 
36 [1960) NZLR 69 (C.A.). 
11 
The Rt Hon Phillip Holloway was the Minister of Industries and Commerce. The Truth 
publish an article dealing with the manner in which it was alleged certain import 
licences had been obtained, calling for an inquiry. The paper stated that the response to 
a request for information about import procedures had been "see Phil and Phil would fix 
it". The Minister sued alleging that the words were "defamatory in that, in their context, 
they meant, and were understood to mean, that he was a person who had acted, and was 
prepared to act, dishonestly in connection with the issue of import licences."37 
the Truth argued that qualified privilege should apply because "the subject-matter of the 
article was of substantial and legitimate common interest to every section of the 
community ,"38 The Court of Appeal held that the paper would have been protected if it 
had published its allegations only to the appropriate authority, not to the world at large. 
The Court of Appeal relied upon the speech of Lord Herchell in Davis v Shepstone: 39 
There is no doubt that the public acts of a public man may lawfully be made the subject 
of fair comment or criticism, not only by the Press, but by all members of the public. 
But the distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind between comment or criticism 
and allegations of fact, such as that disgraceful acts have been committed, or 
discreditable language used. It is one thing to comment upon or criticise, even with 
severity, the acknowledged or proved acts of a public man, and quite another to assert 
he has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct. 
The Court of Appeal observed that Newspapers perform two distinct functions. 40 The 
first, to provide readers with fair and accurate reports of proceedings, judicial and 
otherwise, and of public meetings and the like, this function being supported by the 
Defamation Act 1954. The second function being to provide readers with news, and 
even gossip, concerning current events and people: 41 
37 Above n 36, 79. 
38 Above n 36, 81. 
39 
( 1886) 11 App. Cas. 187 
40 Above n 36, 83. 
41 Above n 36, 83. 
o• 
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In this second field, in our opinion, there is no principle of law, and certainly no case 
that we know of, which may be invoked in support of the contention that a newspaper 
can claim privilege if it publishes a defamatory statement of fact about an individual 
merely because the general topic developed in the article is a matter of public interest. 
While the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the categories of qualified privilege were 
not closed,42 it classified the occasion of the allegation against Mr Holloway as falling 
within the second field of the newspaper's functions and not protected by qualified 
privilege. The decision in Holloway is not only significant for its rejection of a proposed 
new category of privilege based on "public interest" alone, but also for the Court of 
Appeal ' s finding that it was not in the public interest to find on the facts of the case a 
duty to publish to the general public the allegations of impropriety against the Minister. 
In terms of recognising the proper operation of the democratic process and principle of 
participation in government, I suggest that in Holloway the Court of Appeal was 
implicitly favouring the importance of due process rather than trial by media. If the 
allegations about Mr Holloway had been reported to, and investigated by, the 
appropriate authority then the public would have learned of the matter through the 
protected publication of reports of that authority 's proceedings. The relevance to the 
democratic process of this policy approach is that the public shall learn of scandalous 
allegations in a context where they are being treated simply as allegations which at some 
stage will be upheld or rejected by the forum society has appointed to decide such 
matters. Such a policy approach was embodied in the Defamation Act 1954 and has 
been carried over in the Defamation Act 1992. It is a policy approach which aims to 
achieve openness of process and public knowledge of such allegations, while ensuring 
the integrity of the democratic system by not protecting the publication to the public of 
false or unprovable allegations as statements of fact. 
3 Eyre v New Zealand Press Association Limitet:143 
42 Above n 36, see 81 and 82 for a discussion of M G. Perera v Peiris [ 1949] A.C. I . 43 
[ 1968) NZLR 736 
13 
Mr Eyre was the retiring Minister of Defence, on 23 November 1968 he spoke at a 
political meeting held at Davenport in support of the candidature of Mr G.F. Gair, the 
National Party candidate for the North Shore. During the course of his speech Mr Eyre 
commented that he would give North Vietnam a basinful of bombs if he had his way, 
this remark was qualified to the effect that bombs should be dropped on military targets 
only. Some time later in his speech Mr Eyre made remarks dealing with Oriental people 
being different. The New Zealand Press Association ("the Press Association") 
forwarded a condensed report of Mr Eyre's speech to morning newspapers in New 
Zealand and a second condensed report to the Australian Associated Press and to 
Reuters, The material part of the second report read: 
.. . Mr Dean Eyre, told an election meeting here tonight that if he had his way he would 
"give North Vietnam a basinful of bombs tomorrow morning". 
Mr Eyre was stung by interjectors disagreeing with the National Party' s Vietnam 
policy during the sometimes-stormy meeting. 
"What about the children", shouted a heckler. 
Mr Eyre: "Children died in London from bombs too. We are not dealing with 
ourselves, we are dealing with Oriental people. They are different from ourselves. 
The jury found that the two reports were defamatory and awarded damages totalling 
$30,000. McGregor J was required to decide whether the publication by the Press 
Association was protected by qualified privilege. At the outset McGregor J pointed out 
that any privilege would have to come from the common law as the Defamation Act 
1954 only protected "fair and accurate " reports of the occasions listed in the First 
Schedule of the Act.44 
On behalf of the Press Association it was argued that as it had acted without malice it 
should enjoy the protection of a "generous privilege" to serve the public interest in the 
matter of news. It was also argued that it was in the public interest that there should be 
free dissemination of thoughts, ideas and newsworthy events, and that it was for the 
44 Above n 43, 739. 
14 
Court to decide whether the "occasion" as distinct from the "communication" was 
privileged. McGregor J held:45 
Here the defendant had an honest belief in respect of the correctness of its report as to 
what the plaintiff had said. It may well have possessed a duty to communicate what 
was said by the plaintiff to its associates, but in my view it had no duty to 
communicate an incorrect report of what the plaintiff had said. Such a claim to 
communicate in my opinion, is not "in the interests of the community", is not "for the 
welfare of society", is not "for the common good of society in general", is not "for the 
common convenience and welfare of society". The phrases I have used are those on 
which occasions of qualified privilege have been held to be based ...... .l do not think in 
any case the protection given is wider than that given to newspapers originally by the 
Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888, a condition of such protection being that the report 
be fair and accurate. The publication must be for the public benefit... ... An inaccurate 
report cannot be for the public benefit. The Court must be satisfied that the publication 
of the very words complained of is for the public benefit. 
But for the inaccuracy of the reporting the occasion of the publication in Eyre would 
have fallen squarely within the first of the two categories referred to in Holloway. The 
theme of a policy approach which promotes freedom of information, but which protects 
the integrity of the democratic process by ensuring potentially defamatory allegations 
are presented to the public in the proper context is reinforced in Eyre. Parliament's 
policy objective was that the public should receive reports of the views of politicians 
expressed at public meetings, even if such reports contained defamatory allegations at 
least the public would know that such allegations had originally been made in a context 
that Parliament had chosen on policy grounds to protect. However, to extend the 
protection of the privilege to beyond an accurate report of what was actually said at the 
public meeting would be to move beyond Parliament's policy choice as to how freedom 
of information should be balanced with preserving the integrity and truth of political 
discourse. 
45 Above n 43, 741,742. 
15 
I suggest that there are clear merits in maintaining a clear delineation between protected 
and unprotected occasions. It seems evident today that statements made in Parliament 
under the protection of parliamentary protection are perceived by the public as less 
likely to be true than statements for which the maker may be held accountable. By 
extending the boundaries of privilege too wide, for example beyond true and accurate 
reports in Eyre, there will be too few occasions upon which the public will be able to 
rely upon the integrity of the information it receives about the operation of the 
democratic system. 
4 Brooks v Muldoon 46 
Mr Brooks had been unanimously recommended by a committee set up by the Minister 
of Labour for appointment to the post of chief mediator under a 1970 amendment to the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. Notwithstanding the committee's 
recommendation, Cabinet and the Government Caucus, both of which the Rt Hon 
Robert Muldoon was a member by virtue of being Minister of Finance, declined to 
appoint Mr Brooks. Mr Muldoon made several public statements on the matter, 
referring to Mr Brooks as being "a way-out militant", "a way-out left winger when 
involved with the National Union of Teachers", and that "his approach to industrial 
relations was entirely unorthodox and outside the scope of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act". Mr Muldoon also seriously misquoted an earlier statement by Mr 
Brooks. 
Mr Books sued in defamation on four publications. Mr Muldoon pleaded qualified 
privilege.47 Having held that at the material time the appointment of chief mediator was 
an issue of national importance and that the public press and community at large had a 
"corresponding interest" to receive advice that the post had been filled Halsam J said:48 
46 [1973) NZLR l 
47 Although Mr Brooks was not a candidate for elected political office the decision is still relevant as 
Elias J indicated that the expanded qualified privilege "could extend to information about the public 
conduct of those involved in political debate, whether or not they are elected or public officials." See 
above n 5, 46. 
48 Above n 46, 8,9. 
16 
But the relevant facts do not end there, and it 'does not follow that publication of all 
matters of public interest is in the public interest' (Flemming on Torts 4th ed 499) ..... . 
In my view, if imputations are made in such a setting against the fitness of an applicant 
for a public appointment, whether or not the post be still vacant, on the grounds of 
alleged bias or inadequacy on his part, then a defendant must be prepared to justify his 
words .... for the public had no interest in receiving information which was tortious in 
content. 
Halsam J acknowledged that the selection committee may have had sufficient interest 
receive the statements made by Mr Muldoon, and that Mr Muldoon may have been 
under a duty to impart his views to that committee, However, he could not sanction the 
publication of the defamatory statement to the public at large.49 
5 Lucas & Son (Nelson Mail) Ltd v O'Brien50 
In 1969 Mr O'Brien resigned from the New Zealand Social Credit Political League 
("Social Credit") and became the leader of a new political party called the New 
Democrat Party, standing for that party in the 1972 general election in the Nelson 
electorate. On 21 November 1972 Social Credit filed proceedings against Mr O'Brien 
and others, alleging that assets properly belonging to Social Credit had been transferred 
for the purposes of the new party and to assist Mr O'Brien's electoral campaign. On 22 
November 1972 the Nelson Mail published an article which in substance repeated the 
allegations contained in the statement of claim. The proceedings initiated by Social 
Credit were discontinued on 10 November 1975. Mr O'Brien sued both the publishers 
of the Nelson Mail and Social Credit in defamation. 
The defendants pleaded privilege on the basis of: a) a moral and social duty to publish 
the contents of Social Credit's allegations to the general public; b) a fair and accurate 
report of court proceedings, and c) a fair and accurate extract of a court document. In the 
High Court Ongley J struck out all three pleadings of qualified privilege. 
49 Above n 46, 9. 
50 
[ 1978] 2 NZLR 289 
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The Court of Appeal upheld the striking out of the pleadings based on reporting court 
proceedings and court documents, but in relation to the pleading bases on a moral or 
social duty held: 51 "we have not the requisite material upon which to reach a definite 
and certain conclusion [that the defence] is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly 
succeed". Richmond P considered that there needed to be evidence of the degree of 
public interest in the subject matter at the time of publication, and as to the circulation 
of the Nelson Evening Mail, but that: 52 "there will be difficulties in the way of 
establishing that the occasion of publication was a privileged one is apparent from the 
various authorities cited ... ". 
The President of the Court of Appeal cited with approval from Bradney v Virtue, 
particularly the reference to the definition of a social or moral duty by Lindley L.J. in 
Stuart v Bell. The statement in Gatley that: 53 " ••• no privilege would attach to the 
publication of matter injurious to the character of a candidate in a public newspaper" 
was referred to by the Court of Appeal, as was the statement by Lord Denman CJ in 
Duncombe v Daniell: 54 
However large the privilege of electors may be, it is extravagant to suppose, that it can 
justify the publication to all the world of facts injurious to a person who happens to 
stand in the situation of a candidate 
Richmond P observed that Lord Denman's statement had been accepted as correct the 
statement of law by the Supreme Court of Canada in Douglas v Tucker and in Globe & 
Mail Ltd v Boland, noting that in Douglas v Tucker the individuals involved were the 
Premier of Saskatchewan and the Leader of the Opposition.55 
While is may be argued that O 'Brien adds little substantively to the debate as to whether 
qualified privilege should be expanded to encompass political discussion, the decision is 
significant for illustrating perhaps how the striking out application should have been 
51 Above n 50, 297. 
52 Above n 50, 297. 
53 Gatley on Libel and Slander (7th ed, 1974)'para·97. 
54 (1837) 8 C & P 223,229; 173 ER 470,472 
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dealt with by Elias J in Lange. In O'Brien the Court of Appeal's approach was that 
although the law in the area seemed fairly settled there may be some kind of an arguable 
case for extending the privilege on the particular facts of the case, therefore let the facts 
be proved and then the trial judge could decide whether or not those facts combined 
with the recognised principles could justify the expansion of qualified privilege sought 
by the Newspaper defendant. 
6 Templeton v Jones56 
The Hon H C Templeton was the sitting Member of Parliament for the Ohariu seat in 
the 1984 general election. Robert Jones was a declared candidate for the same seat. In a 
speech given to the annual general meeting of the Ohariu Branch of the National Party 
Mr Templeton said: 
Mr Jones is a man who seems to hate. Mr Jones is a man who despises many people .. . 
bureaucrats, civil servants, politicians, women, Jews and professionals. Doesn ' t it 
sound familiar? The politics of hatred. 
Mr Templeton distributed to members of the parliamentary press gallery copies of his 
speech notes, this lead to the publication of parts of the speech on television. Mr Jones 
sued only on the allegation that he despised Jews. Mr Templeton pleaded qualified 
privilege on the basis of:57 
... the social and/or moral duty of the Defendant to make a statement to the general 
public as to the conduct and the fitness for public office of a declared candidate for 
Parliament at the next general election and by reason of the corresponding interest of 
the general public to receive it. 
55 Above n 50, 297; Douglas v Tucker [1952] 1 DLR 657,666; Globe & Mail Ltdv Boland(1960) 22 
DLR (2d)227,280. 
56 [l 984] 1 NZLR 448 
57 Above n 56, 455 . 
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Ongley J had refused to strike out the defence of qualified privilege, it came before the 
Court of Appeal. Cooke J gave the decision of the Court:58 
As the common law of New Zealand stands it is plain enough that the mere fact that the 
plaintiff was a declared parliamentary candidate cannot be treated as imposing on the 
defendant a social or moral duty to make a defamatory statement about him to the 
general public. And, for the reasons already explained, we do not think that it would be 
right to enlarge the common law of New Zealand so as to create a new privilege. 
Cooke J's analysis began with the observation that if Mr Templeton could prove the 
truth of his statements about mr Jones, or he could prove facts upon which an honest 
opinion was based, he would have a complete defence; that only if the statement could 
not be proved true, or it was not an honest opinion an based upon proven facts, would he 
be needing to rely upon qualified privilege.59 
Cooke J observed that under sl 7 and the First Schedule, Part II, cl 11 of the Defamation 
Act 1954 a fair and accurate report of proceedings at a public meeting would be 
privileged if the matter was of public concern and the publication was for the public 
benefit, but that no similar statutory privilege would apply to written material circulated 
by parliamentary or local government candidates. Cooke J obviously did not fully agree 
with the perhaps seemingly arbitrary lines upon which the legislature had drawn the 
boundaries for the protection provided by statutory qualified privilege:60 
The present New Zealand Jaw regarding qualified privilege in the political field is 
probably not wholly logical.. .... To extend the scope of the privilege is not altogether 
without attraction. But it has to be remembered that there are also strong arguments 
against doing so. 
58 Above n 56, 459,460 
59 Above n 56, 456. 
60 Above n 56, 458. 
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The Court of Appeal considered the United States line of cases beginning with New 
York Times v Sullivan61 and in rejecting that type of approach cited the following 
passage from Gatley:62 
It is, however, submitted that so wide an extension of the privilege would do the public 
more harm than good. It would tend to deter sensitive and honourable men from 
seeking public positions of trust and responsibility, and leave them open to others who 
have no respect for their reputation. 
English and Canadian authorities considered by the Court of Appeal supported the 
proposition that publication to the general public of defamatory statements about public 
figures should not be protected. Cooke J cited the McKay Committee' s observation 
that: 63 "The United States rule could open the door to irresponsible journalism based on 
speculation rather than facts and it is difficult to accept that a licence to state false facts 
is necessary for healthy criticism." 
The Court of Appeal considered itself also constrained by the legislative context in 
which it found itself. The McKay Committee had recommended to Parliament a media 
defence aimed at going "a long way towards removing the inhibitory features of the 
present law of defamation. "64 particularly in relation to the publication of defamatory 
statements to the general public. The Court of Appeal held that as the legislature had not 
yet acted on the McKay Committee ' s recommendations it:65 
... should be especially cautious before moving towards a qualified privilege which in 
some ways would be even wider. 
The judgments, textbooks and law reform reports already cited, considered as a whole, 
persuade us that we ought no to introduce anything akin to the American doctrine into 
New Zealand law by judicial decision. If there is to be any major change in this field , it 
should be made by Parliament. 
6 1 376 us 254 (1964) 
62 Gatley on Libel and Slander (8th ed, 1981) para 488, note 65 
63 459 
64 Above n 28, para 491 . 
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Clearly the Court of Appeal was deferring Parliament's role in deciding what should be 
the law in areas involving major policy decisions. The refusal of Parliament to include 
in the Defamation Act 1992 the media defence recommended by the McKay Committee 
was a policy decision of considerable significance. Also of significance was that of cl 
11, Part II of the First Schedule of the Defamation Act 1954 was not amended by the 
Defamation Act 1992 to include occasions such as gave rise to the action in Templeton v 
Jones. 
Templeton v Jones was an important precedent decision by the Court of Appeal, not 
only did it refuse to expand the defence of qualified privilege to encompass the facts of 
the case, facts which were a classic example of political discussion, but the reserving of 
any "major changes in this field" to Parliament should have effectively preempted 
revisiting of these issues in the foreseeable future. 
C The Scope For Judicial Expansion of Qualified Privilege To Occasions of 
Political Discussion Published to the General Public 
The cases discussed above concerned a variety of occasions where the allegedly 
defamatory statement were made in the course of "political discussion". The weight of 
those precedents is clearly against applying common law qualified privilege to 
publications of defamatory statements to the general public. As a question of pure 
precedent the expanded qualified privilege defence pleaded by the defendants in Lange 
should not have survived the striking out application. However, development of the 
common law is not completely pre-empted by the doctrine of starie decisis. A 
consideration of the principles guiding judicial development of the common law is an 
important introduction to the detailed consideration of Lange which follows. 
Not too much needs to be said about the judicial practice of navigating around 
unhelpful precedent decisions by way of distinguishing such cases on their facts. 
Scrutiny of this technique is very much a process of comparing the case in hand with the 
cases which the judge has endeavoured to distinguished. In relation to Lange unless the 
65 Above n 56, 459. 
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precedent cases, particularly Holloway and Templeton v Jones, were validly 
distinguished the principals discussed in the following paragraphs ought to have guided 
Elias J. 
Speaking at the recent conference "The Struggle for Simplicity" held in honour of Lord 
Cooke of Thomdon, Lord Bingham of Comhill said:66 "Lord Radcliffe thought that 
judges should walk warily in fields where Parliament regularly legislated or had recently 
done so." This proposition is usefully expanded upon by Lord Radcliffe in his book Not 
in Feather Beds:67 
I think, that, while it is an illusion to suppose that the legislature is attending or can 
possibly attend all the time to all aspects of the law, there are certain areas of public 
interest which at any one time can be seen to be a matter of its current concern. [If] It 
has recently legislated on that subject according to certain principles (if they can be 
detected) or it regularly legislates on the whole field covered by that subject (as, for 
instance, the law of taxation). In those areas I think that the judge needs to be 
particularly circumspect in the use of his power to declare the law, ... 
Where a judge might be presented with an opportunity to change the law it Lord 
Radcliffe cautioned that: 68 
It is a good thing that judges should be aware of the incidents and circumstances of the 
society of their own day and should be able to realise that these may have changed 
from those to which the rules were originally applied: but the true question for them, I 
think, is how far the situation has altered, so as to generate a new rule, rather than to 
find in the circumstances authority for a change of rule. [ emphasis added] 
I suggest that a fair conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of Lange which follows 
is that the decision is contrary to Lord Radcliff s principles; that Elias J was not 
sufficiently circumspect given the recent legislative activity in the field of defamation, 
66 The Rt Hon Lord Bingham of Comhill, The Judge as a Lawmaker: An English Perspective, in P 
Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke ofThorndon 
(Butterworths, Wellington. 1997). 
67 Viscount Radcliffe Not in Feather Beds (Hamish Hamilton Ltd, London, 1968) 215,216. 
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and that the recent changes in circumstances relied upon by Her Honour69 did not 
genuinely "generate" the new rule, rather, at best, there may be found in those 
circumstances some "authority for" the change to the defence of qualified privilege. 
It is most timely that less than three months before being due to hear the Lange appeal 
the Court of Appeal has given a decision involving "an assessment of the relevant 
considerations of precedent, legal principle and policy, not least the respective rolls of 
the judiciary and the legislature in determining complex public interest questions. "70 
In R v Hine Williams J had been of the view that a key witness for the prosecution in an 
attempted murder case should be able to give evidence without disclosing his name and 
address. However, the earlier Court of Appeal decision in R v Hughes71 had held that as 
a matter of principle the identity of prosecution witnesses, in that case under-cover 
police officers, must be disclosed to the defence. In Hine the majority of the Court of 
Appeal held that it could not depart form the rule in Hughes. 
There are some important similarities in the circumstances of R v Hine and Lange. First, 
in Hughes the majority of the Court of Appeal had expressed the view that any 
significant change to the common law under consideration in that case ought to be made 
by Parliament rather than the Court, an identical view to that expressed by Cooke J in 
Templeton v Jones. Secondly, following Hughes Parliament legislated in the area, it 
enacted anonymity in limited circumstances for undercover police officers. In Hine 
Richardson P considered the scope of the legislative response to Hughes and the 
relevant debate in the House of Representatives. A similar analysis to that adopted in 
Hughes should have been applied to the post-Templeton v Jones legislative 
developments in the law of defamation. 
In 1992 the Defamation Act was passed, it did not significantly expand qualified 
o • 
privilege along any of the lines discussed in Templeton v Jones. During Parliamentary 
68 Above n 67, 223. 
69 Seen 5, 43-46 .. 
70 Above n 7., Richardson P p2. 
71 [1986] 2 NZLR 129. 
24 
debates on the Defamation Bill Members from both Governments72 spoke in support of 
the Bill, stating that there "was no pressing need to change the existing balance between 
freedom of speech and protection of reputation",73 "Defamation law requires a delicate 
balance between the reputation on the individual and freedom of speech ... the Bill as 
reported back is indeed an effective compromise .. [the reforms]are probably less radical 
than some would have hoped."74 "It is not a step that will assist freedom of expression, 
but it is a step that will protect people's reputations ... freedom of expression can be 
facilitated. "75 
In Hine Richardson P confirmed the Court of Appeal's approach to reviewing its earlier 
decisions as stated in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd, 76 that the 
court should not attempt an all-embracing formulation as to considerations that should 
influence the court, but that the members of the court after weighing the considerations 
favouring and negating review in a particular case should make a value judgment as to 
whether it is appropriate in the interests of justice to perhaps overrule an earlier 
decision. 77The President then identified three considerations in determining whether is 
appropriate for the courts to fashion a new rule: 
a) The subject matter and its closeness to the court's function. In Hine judge's 
considerable experience in assessing fair trial questions was relevant; 
b) That in making value judgments the court is seeking to apply underlying 
community values, not the judge's personal values. There is considerable room 
for differences of approach to the balancing of the worth of the individual and 
the human rights of all members of society, and that the emphases given by 
different societies to different values may change over time. Richardson P cited 
the following statement of Brennan J in Dietricht v The Queen: 78 
72 When the Defamation Bill was first introduced in 1988 the Labour Party was in power, for the second 
and third readings of the Bill the National Party was the Government. 
73 Rt. Hon. Geoffrey PalmerNZPD, vol 491, 6369, 25 August 1988. 
74 Hon. D.A. M. Graham NZPD, vol 531, 12144, 10 November 1992. 
75 Hon. David Cagill NZPD, vol 531, 12150, 10 November 1992. 
76 
[ 1986] 1 NZLR 404. 
77 See above n 7, Richardson P p 11. 
78 (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
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The responsibility for keeping the common law consonant with contemporary values 
does not mean that the courts have a general power to mould society and its institutions 
according to judicial perceptions of what is conducive to the attainment of those values. 
c) Whether the question is appropriate for judicial resolution. The President 
emphasised that judges must be conscious of the respective rolls of the three 
branches of government reflected in the Constitution Act 1986: Parliament, the 
Executive and the Courts. He said: 79 
The larger the public policy context, the less well equipped the courts are to weigh 
considerations involved and to attempt to resolve any moral quandaries and the less 
inclined they must be to intervene. That is particularly so where there are public policy 
ramifications affecting the bases of other relevant common law or statutory provisions. 
In short, where the consequences reach beyond the limits of the cases and beyond a 
response to a particular issue." 
Richardson P discussed in some detail the two major problems for the courts in deciding 
public policy litigation, namely: obtaining relevant information and then assessing it. He 
emphasised how the New Zealand Law Commission was far better suited to carry out 
such a function: 80 "That process produces carefully thought out policy with ample public 
participation which is then further subjected, as appropriate, to general governmental 
and parliamentary legislative policy processes." 
On a theoretical plane it may be argued that in deciding Lange Elias J was, subject to 
not being able to distinguish them, strictly bound by the Court of Appeal decisions in 
Holloway and Templeton v Jones and that considerations of the grounds upon which the 
Court of Appeal may review its earlier decisions are irrelevant. However, the 
practicalities of the situation are that it will be the Court of Appeal which will decide 
whether the decision in Lange will stand or not. Therefore the issues considered in Hine 
are directly relevant to an analysis of Lange. 
79 Above n 7, Richardson P pl2. 
80 Above n 7, Richardson P pl4. 
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In Hine it was acknowledged that where significant issues of public policy are involved, 
and the consequences reach beyond the limits of the particular case under consideration, 
these features tell against a judicial law making power. 
Defining the limits of qualified privilege, and particularly any really significant change 
to those limits involves, I suggest, major issues of public policy. The learned author of 
the defamation section of The Laws of New Zealand introduces the subject of qualified 
privilege: 81 "On grounds of public policy, the law affords protection from liability in 
defamation to certain occasions ... ". The expansion of qualified privilege proposed in 
the Lange decision is very significant, even radical. On the basis of the views expressed 
in Hine, the type of change to the law of defamation proposed in Lange should be 
effected by Parliament rather than the High Court or the Court of Appeal. 
11 LANGE V ATKINSON & AUSTRALIAN CONSOLIDATED PRESS NZ LTD 
A The Scope of the Expanded Defence of Qualified Privilege 
Although Elias J only indicated "tentative" views as to the full scope and conditions of 
the expanded qualified privilege defence, the reality is that Her Honour is likely to 
preside at the trial of this case and it is to be expected that the final decision on the 
defence will reflect the judge's views on the defence as expressed in the striking out 
application. In my opinion the proposed defence is radical in character, both in terms of 
very wide subject matter to which it will apply and in the absence of the tempering 
conditions which the Australian High Court imposed on the freedom of political 
discussion defence there. Below I will consider the character of the class of plaintiffs 
against whom the expanded defence may be available and what type of speech may be 
protected. Then the features of the proposed defence will be considered, in particular 
Elias J's rejection of the tempering features of the Australian defence proposed in 
Theophanous and Stephens. 
81 Laws NZ, Defamation para 98. The author is the Right Honourable Justice McKay, recently retired 
Court of Appeal Judge. 
27 
1 To whom and what might the expanded defence apply? 
As to whom the expanded defence might apply Elias J offered little guidance in Her 
judgment other than to indicate concurrence with the Australian approach:82 
In Theophanous members of the Court expressed the views that the privilege could 
extend to information about the public conduct of those involved in political debate, 
whether or not they are elected or are public officials. There may be difficult cases 
where a private person is swept involuntarily into political controversy or where a 
public official holds a minor office. 
The potential of such a formulation is that that the number of individuals against whom 
the expanded qualified privilege defence can be pleaded will be very large indeed. It is 
foreseeable that an individual could be swept into the realm of "public controversy" 
purely by virtue of the fact that a defamatory statement about them has been published. 
Furthermore, such a formulation seems to be not too far removed from that originally 
set down in New York Times v Sullivan83 and which has evolved into the public figure 
defence, a species of defence expressly rejected in Templeton v Jones84. 
As to the type of speech which might be protected by the expanded qualified privilege 
defence Elias J acknowledged that any formulation would be "necessarily imprecise" 
until applied in a tangible context, but that: 85 
"political discussion" is discussion which bears upon the function of electors in a 
representative democracy by developing and encouraging views upon government.. .... 
.. impact upon the functions exercised in a representative democracy by the people 
governed seems a surer standard than is available for the wider concept of "public 
interest". 
82 Above n 5, 46. 
83376 us 254 (1964) 
84 Above n 56. 
85 Above n 5, 46,47. 
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While the physical extremities of this formulation may not be identified until tested on 
the facts of cases involving statements on the margins of what might be classified as 
political discussion, one thing is clear, the subject matter which falls within the 
definition of political discussion is very broad. 
Development of the common law defence of qualified privilege has tended to be 
incremental, permitting limited publication of limited material to limited audiences. 
Expansion of the defence to limited subject matter published to the general public has 
tended to be by way of legislation. 86 Whatever the final limits of the expanded defence 
proposed in Lange may be, the defence will encompass the widest scope of publication 
(ie to the general public), it will apply to a very broad range of potential plaintiffs and 
include a vast array of subject matter. I suggest that not only is scope of the proposed 
defence many times more radical than any previous expansion of qualified privilege 
undertaken by the courts, but its effect on the law of defamation will be as significant as 
any single change undertaken by the legislature in recent times. 
2 Proposed elements of the freedom of political speech category of qualified 
privilege 
Given the very significant scope of the new qualified privilege defence it might have 
been expected that Elias J would follow the Australian High Court and temper the 
defence by introducing conditions to the defence. The Australian conditions were 
summarised by Elias J :87 
All Judges in the High Court of Australia in Stephens (with the exception of Dawson J 
who found it unnecessary to consider the Question) recognised that political discussion 
gives rise to qualified privilege in some circumstances .. ... .ln Theophanous and 
86 See the occasions listed in the First Schedule of the Defamation Act I 992. 
87 Above n 5, 48. Reflecting on Theophanous and Stephens it is arguable that the prerequisites of 
reasonableness of publication, unawareness of falsity, and absence of recklessness, were only applicable 
to the stand alone defence and not to qualified privilege. However, in Lange the defendants included 
these elements in their pleading of qualified privilege, and in Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (Hight Court of Australia, 8 July 1997, FC97/021) the Australian High Court seemed to 
assume that the Theophanous and Stephens decisions these prerequisites were included with qualified 
privilege (see pp 31,32). 
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Stephens all Judges with the exception of Deane J would have imposed preconditions 
upon the availability of the privilege. The majority held that the defendant would be 
liable in damages unless able to establish that he or she was unaware of the falsity, that 
the defendant did not publish recklessly (not caring whether the matter was true or 
false) and that the publication was reasonable (a matter to be established in the 
circumstances of the case to be established in the circumstances of the case either by 
showing that steps were taken to check the accuracy of the information or that 
publication without checking was justified in the circumstances). 
However despite concurring in the result, Deane J in his reasoning in the Australian 
cases rejected the imposition of the preconditions of absence of recklessness and 
reasonableness. 88 The outcome in Lange on the issue of conditions for the 
implementation of the expanded defence is a point somewhere between the result in 
Theophanous and Deane J' s reasoning. 
The decision in Lange seems to have been heralded as an overwhelming victory for the 
defence. 89 However, it must not be overlooked that the stand alone defence pleaded by 
the defendants was struck out. That decision has not been appealed. However, it cannot 
be denied that the striking out of the stand alone defence was a wholly Pyrrhic victory 
for the plaintiff, for although the pleaded stand alone defence was struck out, in Elias J' s 
expansion of qualified privilege the defendant's received much more than they had 
asked, perhaps even hoped, for. 
The defence of qualified privilege founded on freedom of political discussion was 
pleaded by the defendants in Lange on the basis that the North and South article was 
inter alia: 
• Published without malice; 
• Not published recklessly; and 
o • 
88Above n 2, ALR 63. The High Court was sitting with seven members, without Deane J's concurrence 
with Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ the outcome would likely have seen the status quo maintained 
rather than the introduction of the stand alone defence. This strange situation of a Judge concurring in a 
result which was markedly inconsistent with his reasoning so as to arrive at an outcome with was less 
different to the alternative was one of the key-justifications used by the High Court in July 1997 to revisit 
and consequently abolish the stand alone defence. See above n 8. 
89 See G Huscroft "David Lange and the Law of Defamation" [1997] NZLJ 112, S Mills and A Adams 
"Lange Defamation Decision Revitalises Law of Political Expression" (1997) 4 76 Lawtalk I 0. 
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• Was reasonable in the circumstances, having regard to; 
• The first defendant's belief that the article did not contain any matters 
that were false; 
• The steps taken by the first defendant prior to the publication of the 
article; and 
• The matters referred to in paragraphs 41.1 to 41.6 of the defence (the 
political discussion context, absence of malice and recklessness). 
The pleading by a defamation defendant of absence of malice and recklessness, and 
reasonableness of publication was novel. Such pleading seems to have been based upon 
defence counsel's understanding of the Australian position. In a decision which must 
have delighted the defendants Elias J held "tentatively" that they need not plead 
absence of malice or recklessness, or reasonableness of publication save as to the 
element of honest belief. 
In relation to the pleading of malice Elias J observed that section 19 of the Defamation 
Act 1992 "excludes [from qualified privilege] any concept of malice other than that 
where the defendant is predominantly motivated by ill will or otherwise takes improper 
advantage of the occasion of publication."90 Her Honour felt it inappropriate to 
reintroduce the concept of malice as this would be inconsistent with the Act. Such an 
approach seems logical as the expanded qualified privilege defence would still be 
subject to the statutory elements of absence of ill will and improper advantage, albeit 
with the plaintiff bearing the onus. 
As to the pleading of reasonableness in the publication Elias J held that as long as the 
publication did not exceed the occasion such an inquiry would introduce a wide factual 
inquiry as to fault inconsistent with the Defamation Act's restatement of the defence of 
honest opinion. The dubious merit of seeking consistency between qualified privilege 
and honest opinion is considered in detail below,91 suffice to say that this aspiration 
90 Above n 5, 49. 
91 See below part III B3. 
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when critically assessed reveals little to commend it and prormses many practical 
difficulties. 
Elias J gave further reasons for rejecting a requirement of reasonableness in the 
publication. Her Honour referred to Deane J's observation in Theophanous that a 
reasonableness element would require an inquiry in to media methods similar to that 
required by the actual malice rule in New York Times v Sullivan. She felt that this would 
cause increased costs and strain, and greater risks of litigation because it would require 
"a more fine judgment than the United States requirement of clear proof of malice."92 It 
is difficult to accept that an onus on the American plaintiff to prove actual malice of a 
defendant can be likened to a defendant tendering some evidence that there was 
reasonableness in the publication. In practice a defendant will probably need to lead 
evidence of such matters in order to rebut pleas of ill will and improper use of the 
occas10n. 
A further reason give by Elias J for rejecting a requirement of reasonableness in the 
publication was that reasonableness in the sense of absence of negligence has 
historically been rejected as being an element of the defence of qualified privilege. 
Horrocks v Lowe93 and Spring v Guardian Assurance p/c94 support this proposition. 
However, Elias J does not appear to have applied this type of historical analysis when 
proposing the precondition of honest belief,95 an factor more foreign to the defence of 
qualified privilege than the concept of negligence. 
In rejecting the Australian requirement of reasonableness in the publication Elias J 
created a defence easier to invoke than its Australian counterpart. The underlying 
rational for this seems to be a view that in New Zealand political discussion requires 
even greater protection than that provided in Australia. This notion is evident in Elias 
J's conclusion that: 96 
92 Above n 5, 50. 
93 [1975] AC 135 
94 [1995] 2 AC 196 
95 Above n 5, 50. 
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The uncertainties in expanding determination of whether an occasion of qualified 
privilege has been established into a trial of whether a defendant has acted reasonably 
seem to me to provide insufficient protection for political discussion. 
In addition to rejecting the requirement of reasonableness Elias J also rejected the 
Australian requirement that the author of the defamatory statement should have special 
knowledge. Her Honour held that while special knowledge may well be relevant to 
honest belief: 97 "in the market place of ideas it seems to me invidious and dangerous to 
make judgements that free speech is not served except by those with special 
knowledge." 
The expanded qualified privilege defence in Lange is a defence considerably wider in 
scope and easier to invoke than that pleaded by the defendants. Proof of absence of 
malice and recklessness, and the requirement of reasonableness were rejected by Elias J 
and substituted by the ambiguous and novel requirement of honest belief. The net result 
is a defence broader than the Australian stand alone political figure defence, which Elias 
J had had rather ironically suggested earlier in the judgment:98 "would deny the 
protection of the law of defamation to a section of the community in a manner which 
would be inconsistent with Banks v Globe Mail Ltd, Templeton v Jones and Truth (NZ) 
Ltd v Holloway." 
B Problems With Precedent 
1 The failure to successfully distinguish Templeton v Jones and the other New 
Zealand precedent cases 
Prior to Lange as a matter of precedent the answer would have been "no" to the question 
of whether qualified privilege, as a matter of principle as opposed to a conclusion based 
on the facts of a particular case, applied "to speech which is critical of the performance 
in public office of an elected representative and which is published to the general 
96 Above n 5, 50. 
97 Above n 5, 50. 
98 Above n 5, 44. 
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community".99 Of particular significance being Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway and 
Templeton v Jones. While it would be wrong to argue with Elias J's observation that the 
common law of defamation continues to adjust the balance between freedom of speech 
and protection of reputation, such adjustment must build upon and be consistent with 
the precedent case law. When considered in detail Elias J's attempts to sidestep the 
restraining effects of Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway and Templeton v Jones do not survive 
critical scrutiny. 
Elias J distinguished Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway on the basis that: 100 
It did not, however, address the question of a qualified privilege for political 
discussion, but a wider privilege claimed for matters of public interest. 'Merely' 
because the matter developed is of public interest was held to be insufficient. 
But Holloway was not concerned with a "wider privilege". It is misreading of 
Holloway to suggest that a wide privilege based "merely" on public interest was either 
sought by counsel for the newspaper or rejected by the Court of Appeal. Counsel for the 
newspaper argued that it would be in the public interest and for the "general welfare of 
society" 101 if the particular subject matter of that occasion was held to be privileged. By 
contrast the decision in Lange creates an expansive new category of privileged occasion 
which Elias J has held it is for the "common convenience and welfare"102 of New 
Zealand society to protect. Ironically the category created by Elias J would include the 
facts of the particular event to which the Court of Appeal in Holloway refused to extend 
qualified privilege. 
Holloway involved a classic example of core political discussion. It involved 
allegations of impropriety by a government Minister in the discharge of his ministerial 
duties. It had been argued by counsel for the newspaper that members of the public had 
a common interest and concern in the working of the import system and in the 
99 Above n 5, 43 . 
100 Above n 5, 44. 
101 Above n 36, 80. 
102 Above n 5, 46. 
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"activities of Ministers and ordinary Members of Parliament in connection with its 
administration". 103 The Court of Appeal held that although the publication may have 
been of interest to the public, it was not in the public interest to extend qualified 
privilege to that occasion. I suggest that any difference between the "in the public 
interest" test used by the Court of appeal in Holloway and the "common convenience 
and welfare" standard used by Elias J in Lange should be acknowledged to be one of 
semantics not substance. 
The court of Appeal in Templeton v Jones held that while statements to a candidate's 
constituents might be protected by qualified privilege, the mere fact that a plaintiff was 
a declared parliamentary candidate could not be treated a imposing any social or moral 
duty to make a defamatory statement about the candidate to the general public. 104 In 
Lange Elias J expressed the view the emphasis in Templeton v Jones on a plaintiffs 
particular constituency "may overlook the broader participation in government 
recognised by McLachlin J in the Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries case. " 105 This 
proposition is not justifiable as a basis for revisiting the principles so clearly laid down 
by the Court of Appeal in Templeton v Jones. Whether or not the Saskatchewan 
Electoral Boundaries case was consider by the Court of Appeal, issues of participation 
in government and the democratic process were clearly considered in Templeton v 
Jones . 
In Templeton v Jones Cooke J had clearly considered the McKay Committee's Report 
in detail, the introduction to that Report stated: 106 
We accept as an equally basic principle [to protection of reputation] that society is 
entitled to a free flow of information and to give and take robust and stimulating 
comment, this is necessary for a full life, informed decision-making, and effective 
democratic government. 
103 Above n 36, 81 . It is interesting to note that counsel for Truth (NZ) Ltd was Mr R Cooke, now Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon. 
104 Above n 56, 459. 
105 Above n 5, 43 . Reference to Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries case at 31 of Lange. 
106 Above n 28,7. 
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Cooke J had also considered the "view that the scope of qualified privilege in the 
political arena should be extended .. .. [as] ... strongly argued by Mr Geoffrey Palmer ... " in 
various publications including an article titled "Politics and Defamation - a Case of 
Kiwi Humbug?")07 In that article Mr Palmer had argued that: 108 "We need 
uninhibited, robust and wide open debate on public issues in New Zealand. We are not 
getting it and we will not get it unless the libel laws are altered." 
In arriving at the decision not to expand the scope of qualified privilege in the political 
arena the Court of Appeal in Templeton v Jones had clearly formed the view that if 
effect were to be given to contemporary arguments advocating significant changes to the 
limits of the public' s rights of participation in government, such changes should be 
made by the legislature; that in New Zealand the public's rights to participation in 
government did not constitute a "duty" to publish defamatory statements to the general 
public such as might justify an expansion of qualified privilege. 
In Lange Elias J attempted to distinguish Templeton v Jones on basis that the type of 
political discussion in the two cases was different. She accepted that both cases involved 
political figures, however Elias J seems to have been dismissive of Templeton v Jones 
because the Lange article was "concerned with political criticism and discussion of the 
conduct in public office of a national politician .... Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway was closer 
on the facts to the case here because it was concerned with the conduct in office of a 
Minister." 109 But the facts in Templeton v Jones were far closer to the recognised 
parameters of qualified privilege categories than the facts in Holloway. 11 0 It is 
noteworthy that in Templeton v Jones Cooke J had relied upon the "pragmatic 
approach" of the court in Truth (NZ) Ltd V Holloway. In Templeton v Jones the Court 
of Appeal made a number of statements of general principle which I suggest cannot be 
ignored merely because Lange involved a slightly different type of political discussion. 
107 Above n 56, 457. 0 ' 
108 [1972) NZLJ 265 . 
109 Above n 5, 44. 
11 0 Defamatory statements about a candidate's suitability for office were protected by qualified privilege 
save that such statements must only be publis~ed to the relevant constituency. See Templeton v Jones, 
Bradney v Virtue, Lucas & Son (Nelson Evening Mail) Ltd v O'Brien. However, statements about the 
conduct of a Minister would only be protected where a court held that the particular contents of the 
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Cooke J stated that if there were to be any major change "in this field" it should be made 
by Parliament, 111 surely the occasion under consideration in Lange at least fell within the 
same "field" as Templeton v Jones? 
In addition to the failure in Lange to properly deal with the Holloway and Templeton v 
Jones precedents the statements of principle in the other New Zealand decisions dealing 
with the type of public statements which would fall with the scope of Elias J' s 
"political discussion" were not distinguished or otherwise dealt with. In Bradney v 
Virtuel 12 the High Court held privilege would protect only statements to the promoters 
of a candidate and not defamatory statements to the public at large. In Eyre v NZP A 113 
McGregor J held that it was not for the welfare of society or for the common good of 
society to protect the contents of a publication that was no true in substance or in fact, 
this was notwithstanding that the case involved an example of core political discussion. 
Brooks v Muldoonl 14 echoed the reasoning in Holloway, that merely because the 
subject matter of a defamatory statement may have been "of' public interest, protection 
of that statement was not necessarily "in" the public interest. Brooks v Muldoon also 
emphasised the distinction between publication of defamatory statements to those with a 
legitimate interest to receive the statement and publication to the general public. 
2 Why Templeton v Jones and Hyams v Peterson did not "expressly reserve/or 
further consideration" the extension of qualified privilege to occasions of 
political discussion 
As part of the attempt to avoid the binding effect of the dicta in Templeton v Jones 
Elias J held that:115 "In both Templeton v Jones and Hyams v Peterson the extension of 
qualified privilege was clearly reserved for further consideration". With respect, I 
suggest that this proposition is not supported by a close reading of these two cases. 
material were such that there was a duty to inform the public. See Templeton v Jones and Truth (NZ) Ltd 
v Holloway. 
111 Above n 56, 459. 
112 Above n 32. 
113 Above n 43 . 
114 Above n 46. 
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In Templeton v Jones the Court of Appeal had noted that Parliament had not at that time 
adopted the recommendations of the McKay Committee, and that "if any development 
of the law of qualified privilege is to be made in this country, it falls to the Courts. " 116 
After carefully considering the arguments before it the Court of Appeal rejected the 
possibility of expanding the categories of qualified privilege saying that any 
development of the law would have to be undertaken by Parliament. 117 This conclusion 
of the Court of Appeal is totally opposite to the proposition draw from this case and 
relied upon by Elias J. The Court of Appeal having decided that any expansion of 
qualified privilege should be left to parliament went on to consider whether the 
particular facts of the case might fit within the existing law of qualified privilege. The 
conclusion was no. 
Hyams v Peterson 118 was not a case dealing with political discussion, nor did it involve 
qualified privilege. The plaintiff Mr Hyams was a businessman who Mr Peterson had 
defamed by alleging that he was involved in a large scale fraud involving other 
businessmen at the time labelled "the Gang of Twenty". The Court of Appeal was 
deciding appeals against Justice Wiley's refusal to strike out a number of causes of 
action on the basis that the defamatory publications were not capable of being found to 
be referring to Mr Hyams or bearing the defamatory meanings alleged. The media 
defendants argued that evidence of what had been said on absolutely privileged 
occasions (ie. in Parliament) could not be used to prove what the public in fact would 
have understood form what was published in the allegedly defamatory statements. 
Cooke P, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that if there was to be a 
change in the law to give the media greater freedom the Court should not "obscure the 
true issue of policy by a fiction" (ie. the ban on particular evidence), that if there were to 
be any change in the law in favour of the media "it should be made by way of extending 
the defences of privilege and fair comment."119 However the President was at 
considerable pains to emphasise that the decision in Hyams v Peterson had nothing to 
115 Above n 5, 44. 
116 Above n 56, 457. 
117 See above n 65 . 
118 [1991) 3 NZLR 648 
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do with qualified privilege. In case there was some remote chance of ambiguity in his 
statement "We are not called upon to determine any question concerning these 
[including qualified privilege] defences" Cooke P closed his judgment with the 
statement "Last it may be as well to repeat that this Court has not been concerned with 
the various defences of justification, qualified privilege and fair comment."120 
Nothing in Hyams v Peterson diminishes the findings of the Court of Appeal in 
Templeton v Jones. It cannot be denied that there is scope for the incremental evolution 
of the common law of qualified privilege by the application of established principles to 
new or novel fact situations. However, to read into Templeton v Jones and Hyams v 
Peterson some kind of judicial mandate to revisit the statements of principle laid down 
by the Court of Appeal is unsustainable. 
It may be argued that the principles of precedent when properly applied to Lange should 
result in the decision being overturned on appeal and that little more needs to be said 
about the judgment. However, it seems that appellate courts seem to find ways around 
sticky issues of precedent when the substantive merits of the cases compel an alternative 
outcome. For this reason it is important to consider the substantive reasons why Elias J 
in Lange decided that the defence of qualified privilege should undergo this very 
significant expansion. 
C How Compelling are Elias J's Reasons for Such a Radical Expansion of 
Qualified Privilege? 
In Templeton v Jones the Court of Appeal had refused to undertake what in practical 
terms may have constituted a relatively modest and incremental expansion of qualified 
privilege. 121 In Lange the High Court has undertaken a very significant adjustment to the 
11 9 Above n 118,657. 
120 Above n 118, 656 and 658. 
121 See above n. 56. Had the Court of Appeal in Templeton v Jones considered that qualified privilege 
should apply to the circumstances of that case a limited expansion of qualified privilege could have been 
achieved by holding that qualified privilege not only applies to reports of a speech made at a public 
meeting but also to the speech notes used by the speech maker. Such a solution might have cured one of 
the "not wholly logical" aspects of the New Zealand law regarding qualified privilege referred to by 
Cooke J(458). 
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balance between freedom of speech and protection of reputation. What reasons do we 
find in Lange that eluded the Court of Appeal in Templeton v Jones? The crux of Elias 
J's justification for expanding qualified privilege was the following statement: 122 
In a system of representative democracy, the transcendent public interest in the 
development and encouragement of political discussion extends to every member of 
the community. A lesser protection for such communications if made to the general 
public than is available to sections of the community able to point to a common 
interest which may be of no direct public value at all, seems to me to be a result which 
is wrong. It is a result which is not consistent with the underlying principle of 
protection of communications 'for the common convenience and welfare of society'. 
Comment upon the official conduct and suitability for office of those exercising the 
powers of government is essential to the proper operation of a representative 
democracy .. .It is necessary for the public to be informed about these matters for a 
representative democracy to function. 
Three key factors may be identified in the Lange judgment as supporting the above 
conclusion, they are: Elias J's opinion that earlier decisions had not properly considered 
the importance of the democratic process, a perceived legislative trend favouring the 
adjustment of the historical balance between public rights to participation in the 
democratic process and individual rights to reputation, and the desirability of achieving 
in the area of political discussion consistency on the element of fault between qualified 
privilege and honest opinion. These three factors are discussed in detail below, none 
stand up to critical analysis. But what is of greater concern is that the judgment 
represents a High Court judge expressing personal opinion as law, yet that opinion is in 
conflict with the central themes of the common law defence of qualified privilege as it 
has evolved over many years. Qualified privilege has developed on the basis of courts 
making the judgment that the public interest, common convenience or welfare of society 
justifies protecting particular occasions, such occasions have usually been defined by 
deeming that statements concerning a particular subject matter may be made to a limited 
number of recipients considered to have a special interest in hearing such statements. the 
greater the size of the audience to whom a defamatory statement has been published the 
122 Above n 5, 46 
40 
more reluctant the courts have been to extend the defence, hence the historical 
reluctance to extend qualified privilege to defamatory statements broadcast to the public 
at large. In a nutshell Elias J' s ultimate conclusion must have been that the 
jurisprudence which constitutes the common law defence of qualified privilege is 
fundamentally flawed. Without the most compelling of justifications this conclusion 
could not be sustained. 
1 The perceived failure of the earlier cases to properly consider the proper role 
of the democratic process 
Elias J's finding that the New Zealand cases may have overlooked the principle of 
participation in government has been considered in some detail under the Problems with 
precedent heading above. It seems clear from the cases considered earlier in this paper 
that the common law of defamation has evolved in New Zealand with judges always 
acknowledging either explicitly or at least implicitly "that the maintenance of the 
democratic process is of fundamental importance"123 and that freedom of political 
discussion has a crucial part to play in maintenance of that process, albeit perhaps the 
concept has not been expressed using the same terminology adopted by Elias J. 
In Massey, Bradney v Virtue, Truth (NZ) v Holloway, Brooks v Muldoon, Lucus & Son 
(Nelson Mail) Ltd v O 'Brien, and Templeton v Jones the High Court and Court of 
Appeal considered the balance between freedom of political speech and protection of 
reputation in the context of publications of defamatory statements to the general public. 
In discussing these cases I have noted how the courts gave particular consideration to 
the importance of maintaining the democratic principles upon which New Zealand 
society is based. 
At this stage of the discussion is also opportune to emphasise that under the law as it 
existed prior to Lange New Zealanders were totally free to participate in political 
discussion by publishing statements to the general public where the truth of the 
statement could be proved true, or the statement was one of an honest opinion, or the 
123 Above n 5, 45 . 
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occasion was recognised by statute or common law as being one of absolute or qualified 
privilege. 
2 The "legislative trend" favouring expansion of qualified privilege 
Elias J justified her finding that the "transcendent public interest" favoured greater 
freedom of political discussion in part on the basis a perceived a trend in certain 
legislation, namely the Official Information Act 1982, the Electoral Act 1993 and most 
significantly the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Having considered this 
legislation Elias J said: 124 
But the significance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is that it recognises that the 
maintenance of the democratic process is of fundamental importance. The balancing of 
rights, critical to the law of defamation, is required by sS of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 now to be guided by the underlying assumptions of democratic 
govemment... ... The weighting now given to the democratic process by sS [Bill of 
Rights Act] requires reconsideration of the protection provided by the common law for 
political speech. Section 5 is recent and important legislative recognition of the same 
values recognised by the High Court of Australia and applied by the Judges of that 
Court in reassessment of the balance struck by the common law between freedom of 
speech and protection of reputation." 
The two significant difficulties here are that Elias J has attributed inappropriate status to 
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and she has failed to give due consideration to 
countervailing but equally applicable legislative trends. 
Section 5 is important legislative confirmation of the democratic process, however, 
contrary to the effect of Elias J' s finding, I suggest that section 5 does not elevate 
democratic process to a to a higher constitutional status than it previously occupied, or if 
elevated then certainly not to the heights required to sustain Elias J' s conclusions. If 
Parliament had intended in the Bill of Rights Act to accord superior constitutional 
protection to the democratic process .it would have expressly stated such a significant 
124Above n 5, 45. 
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intention, or at the very least adopted the wording of Article 10(2) of the Convention for 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which permits only such limits 
to the protected rights and freedoms as are "necessary" in a free and democratic society. 
Instead New Zealand opted to follow the words of the Canadian Convention and allow 
the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights to be subject to such legal 
limitations as can be "demonstrably justified" in a free and democratic society. The 
distinction is significant: "Section 5 [ of the] Bill of Rights can be regarded as allowing a 
rather broader scope of restrictions upon freedom of expression than s 10 of the 
Convention. "125 
The balance struck between freedom of political speech and protection of reputation in 
the earlier New Zealand decisions on qualified privilege should only have been 
overtumed126 through the application of section 5 if it could be established that the 
limitations those cases placed on freedom of expression could not be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. This stance involves no denial of Elias J's 
statement that "Representative democracy is fundamental to the New Zealand social and 
legal order. Political debate is at the core of representative democracy."127 However, 
where in these observations or in section 5 is the justification for radically recasting the 
rules governing political debate in accordance with the principles adopted by the 
Australian High Court? The status of the fundamental democratic rights upon which the 
Australian law has developed is such that the High Court has indicated that the 
"constitutional implication" could be invoked to strike out legislation which the High 
Court might find to be insufficiently protective of freedom of political speech from 
defamation, 128 such an approach on the basis of s5 of the Bill of Rights Act is expressly 
precluded by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
125 Above n 21, 59. See also Solicitor-Genera/ v Radio New Zealand Ltd [ 1994] 1 NZLR 48. 
126 1n my view this is the effect of the decision in Lange as prima facie it would appear that if the Lange 
test were applied to the facts of all the earlier cases the outcomes would have been the denial of a remedy 
to most, if not all, of the defamed plaintiffs. 
127 Above n 5, 46. 
128 Above n 8, 34. Although the High Court found that the Defamation Act 1977 (NSW) did not infringe 
the constitutional implication it said; "However, the need to develop the common law to conform with the 
constitutional implication may require that defamation legislation in other States be reevaluated. It is 
unnecessary in this case to consider whether, when so evaluated, that legislation is reasonably appropriate 
and adapted in the sense indicated, and if not, the extent to which it is invalid." 
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If Elias J had been free from precedent to consider extending qualified privilege on the 
grounds of the legislative trend toward members of the public having greater direct 
participation in shaping policies (the Official Information Act) and a franchise interest 
beyond their own immediate constituency (the Electoral Act), then before acting on 
such a trend Her Honour should have weighed both the countervailing legislative trends 
discussed in the following paragraphs and the ever increasing power of the mass media 
In Quinn I 29 Lord Cooke referred to the power of the mass media as being a factor 
telling against restricting the existing law as to damages in defamation. When 
introducing the Defamation Bill the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer expressed the view of the 
Government that "the news media environment has changed dramatically since 1977. "130 
Any legislative trend toward greater public participation in the democratic process has 
been accompanied by a significant increase in the role of the mass media in that process. 
Some might argue that the freedom enjoyed by the media even prior to Lange was too 
great, that the integrity of the democratic process has been diluted by the increase in 
tabloid style journalism, that news is more often presented with an editorial slant and 
that the speed and coverage of dissemination by the mass media can only be kept honest 
by the presence of legal check and balances such as are provided by defamation. 
The relevant but countervailing legislative trends to which I have referred include the 
general trend of greater protection of an individual's inherent dignity, particularly, 
protection of individual privacy which includes the principle of using only correct 
information about an individual, and entitlement to treatment in accordance with 
principles of fairness and natural justice. 
Although the news media is presently excluded from the definition of "agencies" to 
whom the Privacy Act 1993 applies, various statements in the House of Representatives 
when this exemption was debated made it clear that continued exclusion was dependent 
129 Above n 21,38. It is also interesting to note that in Quinn Lord Cooke observed that the Australian 
trend in defamation was opposite to that in Canada, in Australia there was discerned a greater need to 
protect defendants and the cases based on the constitutional implication of freedom of political discussion 
were "One manifestation of the trend" (Quinn, 35). While Lord Cooke stated that the Australian 
constitutional implication cases were not relevant for the purposes of deciding Quinn, it is significant that 
the outcome of the Court of Appeal's decision in Quinn was not supportive of the Australian trend of 
giving greater protection to defendants. 
130 NZPD, vol 491, 6369, 25 August 1988. 
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on effective self-regulation. 131 Therefore, at the very least media behaviour should be 
consistent with the principles of the Privacy Act. Of particular relevance are Privacy 
Principles 7 and 8 which create the right of correction of inaccurate information and the 
requirement that agencies take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to 
ensure information is accurate before it is used. The legislative trend favouring 
protection of personal privacy is also evidenced in s4(1)(c) of the Broadcasting Act 
1989 and s9(2)(a) of the Official Information Act 1982. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act affirms New Zealand's commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one of the objectives of the 
Covenant is to protect and enhance the inherent dignity of the individual. The Covenant 
includes protection ofreputation as part of this concept: 
Article 17 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
Article 19 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article [freedom of 
expression rights] carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and 
are necessary: 
(a) For protection of the rights or reputations of others; 
The Bill of Rights includes specific protections which are analogous to the principles 
underpinning defamation. Section 9 protects against "cruel treatment", being subjected 
to public odium and ridicule because lies have been published about an individual is 
very cruel treatment. Section 19 protects individuals from discrimination on the grounds 
of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993, it is arguable that discrimination on 
the basis of untruths published to the general public is an equally undesirable practise. 
Section 25 of the Bill of Rights prescribes minimum standards of criminal procedure 
aimed at ensuring a fair hearing, should not the tenor of this sentiment apply where the 
131 See P Roth Privacy Law and Practice (Butterworths Wellington) 1002.5. 
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case is one of trial by media. While in a free democracy vigorous public debate is 
crucial, defamation provides one of the minimum standards which helps ensure the 
process is fair to all involved. 
The legislative trend against misleading conduct in trade as evidenced in the Fair 
Trading Act is also relevant. While it is clear that the Fair Trading Act does not apply to 
the news media, 132 it remains as an issue of principle that in publishing defamatory 
statements to the general public the media is in the course of a very lucrative trade 
engaging in misleading conduct, something most other business are prohibited from 
doing. 
In August 1996 the Protected Disclosures Bill was introduced, recently a select 
committee reported back on the bill. The select committee has recommend that the 
legislation only apply to the public sector. The proposed legislation, which in its current 
form is indicative of the Government's current views on matters, does not protect 
disclosure of "serious wrongdoing" to the media, but only to those who have a specific 
interest in receiving the information. The principles which underpin the disclosure rules 
contained in this proposed legislation are almost entirely consistent with those of the 
traditional formulation of qualified privilege. Clearly the Parliament in 1997 does not 
consider that accountability of the public sector, something which falls squarely within 
Elias J' s formulation of political discussion, should be in all instances conducted 
through the media. Indeed one media submission to the select committee opposed the 
bill due to its negative effect on freedom of expression as the proposed system will 
discourage whistleblowers from making public their concerns about serious wrong 
doing in their workplace. 133 Surely the public interest favours the publication of the 
results of properly conducted inquiries or proceedings when such have been carried out 
and justice done to all concerned, rather than the premature publication of unproven and 
untested allegations which may have the effect of completely devastating the 
respondent's life notwithstanding the fact that vindication may follow. 
132 See section 14 of the Fair Trading Act. Also Ron West Motors Ltd v Broadcasting Corporation of New 
Zealand [1989] 3 NZLR 520. 
133 p Pepperwell, Editorial 20 TCL 38/1 
46 
These legislative trends weigh heavily against denying to a significant and important 
sector of the community the protection from publication of lies to the general public 
provided by the law of defamation; of substituting due process for trial by media. 
3 The quest for consistency between the defences of honest opinion and 
qualified privilege 
Although not necessarily presented in the judgment as a primary reason for considering 
expanding the defence of qualified privilege, the proposition that "the two defences of 
honest opinion and qualified privilege should conform on the question of fault"134 was 
central to Elias J' s reasoning for why the scope of the expanded privilege should not 
include an element of reasonableness on the part of the publisher. This proposition 
resulted in a defence significantly wider in scope than its Australian counterpart . 
Elias J suggested that if consistency between qualified privilege and honest opinion 
were to be achieved "the only appropriate condition for raising qualified privilege 
should be honest belief."135 No recognised authority or principle was cited to support the 
proposition that there should be consistency between the elements of these two very 
different defences. 
The Defamation Act treats the defences honest op1mon and qualified privilege 
completely separately and very differently. If a defendant's words are opinions rather 
than statements of fact then the defence of honest opinion may be available, if available 
it will be far easier to invoke than qualified privilege. This is because the two defences 
are completely different in nature. The defence of honest opinion operates to define the 
boundary between expressions of genuinely held opinions and defamatory statements of 
fact. Whereas qualified privilege deals with defamatory statements of fact which the 
Defamation Act or the common law deems should be protected from defamation 
liability because the prevailing public interest requires that such statements should be 
protected. 
134 Above n 5, 50. 
135 Above n 5, 50. 
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It is difficult of accept that there is any platform from which to reach for consistency 
between honest opinion and qualified privilege when qualified privilege is subject to the 
requirements of commonality of interest between publisher and audience, and absence 
of both ill will and improper advantage of the occasion. But the defence of honest 
opinion is devoid of either requirement, the Defamation Act having done away with the 
traditional elements of a public interest in the subject matter and absence of malice 
which attached to the defence of fair comment. 
Elias J proposed that conformity between the defences of honest opm10n and fair 
comment on the issue of fault in the area of political discussion would have particular 
merit where there might be difficulties distinguishing between statements of fact and 
opinion. 136 In practice this distinguishing exercise can present real difficulties. However, 
it should not always be automatically assumed that difficulties in invoking a defence run 
contrary to the rationale under pinning the defence. The defence of honest opinion exists 
to protect the public expression of genuinely held views, comments and opinions when 
presented as such. If such views, comments or opinions are published to the public 
sounding more like statements of fact than expressions of opinion it seems only just that 
the defence is more difficult to invoke. 137 
It seems that Elias J has proposed that if conformity between honest opm1on and 
qualified privilege is achieved on the issue of fault, at least in the arena of political 
discussion, then all statements falling within the generic category of political discussion 
whether they be statements of fact or opinion could be dealt with similarly, thereby 
avoiding the difficulty of separating the two. In practice such an approach would be 
unworkable. Where the defences of honest opinion and qualified privilege are pleaded in 
relation to statements of fact and opinion with out distinguishing between the two, a 
plaintiff would need only serve a notice in terms of section 41 of the Defamation Act ~· 
alleging that the defendant was predominantly motivated by ill will or otherwise took 
improper advantage of the occasion of publication. Prudent defendants must object that 
136 Above n 5, 50. 
137 Seen 17, pl2 where Tompkins J confirmed that the onus was on the defendant to prove what were the 
alleged statements of honest opinion and that they were genuinely held opinions. 
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such a notice cannot apply to their statements of honest opinion. A fair objection, but 
one which would result in such defendants again shouldering the onus of proving 
exactly what was opinion. 
In any event, the defence of honest opinion will fail "unless the defendant proves that 
the opinion expressed was the defendant's genuine opinion." (section 10 Defamation 
Act), particularly where a notice in terms of section 39 of the Defamation Act has been 
given by the plaintiff alleging that the opinion was not the genuine opinion of the 
defendant. Central to his defence is identification of what exactly are the statements of 
op1ruon. 
There is a further difficulty with the objective of seeking commonality between honest 
opinion an fair comment on the issue of fault. Elias J proposed that the only appropriate 
condition , once an occasion of political discussion was been established, would be that 
of honest belief. However, the inquiry into what constitutes an honest belief in an 
opinion held by an individual must be very different to an honest belief in the truth of a 
statement of fact. 
III RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
J Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
During the three years after the decisions in Theophanous and Stephens the composition 
of the Australian High Court changed significantly. Two of the majority judges in 
Theophanous and Stephens had retired. 138 Brennan J who had been opposed to the stand 
alone defence in Theophanous and Stephens had become the Chief Justice. The scene 
was set for the High Court to revisit Theophanous and Stephens. In a most remarkable 
coincidence the case which would provide the opportunity would involve David Lange 
as plaintiff. 
138 Mason CJ and Deane J. None of the judges opposed to the stand alone defence in Theophanous and Stephens had retired, Brennan, McHugh and Dawson JJ. 
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In the New Zealand Lange decision Elias J had rejected the concept of a stand alone 
defence, preferring to achieve an adjustment in the balance between freedom of speech 
and protection of reputation by expanding the existing common law defence of qualified 
privilege. In the ABC decision the Australian High Court duplicated the Elias J's 
approach by unanimously rejecting the concept of a stand alone defence, preferring to 
achieve conformity with the perceived requirements of the implied rights of freedom of 
political discussion arising from the Constitution Act by recognising an expanded 
qualified privilege defence. 139 Upon considering the varied conditions of society as set 
out by McHugh Jin Stephens 140 the High Court held that it should: 141 
now declare that each member of the Australian community has and interest in 
disseminating and receiving information, opinions and arguments concerning 
government and political matters that affect the people of Australia ..... That interest that 
each member of the Australian community has in such a discussion extends the 
categories of qualified privilege .... the real question is as to the conditions upon which 
this extended category of common law qualified privilege should depend. 
The High Court distinguished between the usual type of occasion protected by qualified 
privilege which involves publication to a limited audience, and the expanded category 
of qualified privilege which would protect publication to the general public. Whereas 
the single discipline of honesty of purpose, absence of malice, would provide sufficient 
protection of reputation on occasions of publication to a limited audience, the High 
Court held that when publication is to the general public and the scope for damage is 
much greater: 142 
a requirement of reasonableness as contained in s 22 of the Defamation Act (NSW), 
which goes beyond mere honesty, is properly to be seen as reasonable appropriate and 
adapted to the protection of reputation ... Reasonableness of conduct is an element for 
139 The hearing of the ABC case before the High Court appears to have been a Huge affair. In addition to 
hearing counsel for David Lange and ABC, counsel instructed by leading media organisations, most of 
the federal states and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth appeared as interveners or amice 
curiae. At the hearing there appears to have been 27 counsel, of which 11 were Queens Counsel 
140 See Stephens n 3, ALR 114, Referred to by Elias Jin Langen 5, at 41,42. 
141 Above n 8, 29. 
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the judge to consider only when a publication concerning a government or political 
matter is made in circumstances that, under the English common law, would have 
failed to attract a defence of qualified privilege. 
The High Court avoided being prescriptive as to the particular elements which might 
constitute reasonableness of in a publication, preferring the principled approach that: 143 
"the defendant must establish that its conduct in making the publication was reasonable 
in all the circumstances of the case." However the Court provided some guidance as to 
the factors it considered might indicate reasonableness of conduct in a publication. 
In all but exceptional cases the High Court expected that proof of reasonableness would 
fail : 144 "unless the publisher establishes that it was unaware of the falsity of the matter 
and did not act recklessly in making the publication." Generally a defendant would not 
be found to have acted reasonably unless it proves that it: 145 "had reasonable grounds for 
believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so far as they were reasonably 
open, to verify the accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be 
untrue." 
The High Court suggested that in the context of expanded qualified privilege defence 
the concept of '"actuated by malice ' is to be understood as signifying a publication 
made not for the purpose of communicating government or political information or 
ideas, but for some improper purpose. " 146 This approach to the concept of malice echoes 
that found ins 19 of the Defamation Act 1992 (NZ). 
The High Court also held that a defendant's conduct would not be reasonable unless it 
had:141 
... sought a response from the person defamed and published the response made (if any) 
except in cases where the seeking or publication of a response was not practicable or it 
was unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. 
142 Above n 8, 31 . 
143 Above n 8, 31,32. 
144 Above n 8, 32. 
14 5 Above n 8, 33 . 
146 Above n 8, 32. 
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The High Court concluded that while defamation might still burden communications 
necessary to give effect to freedom of choice in federal elections, an expanded defence 
of qualified privilege on the terms outlined would not unduly burden the freedom; that 
"the law of New South Wales goes no further than is reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to achieve the protection ofreputation ... " 148 
The decision in ABC brings the Australian and New Zealand positions into alignment in 
one respect in that the abolition of the stand alone defence sees both countries dealing 
with an expanded qualified privilege defence. There remains, however, two significant 
issues of divergence. First, the New Zealand defence by not including a requirement of 
reasonableness in the publication will be significantly easier to invoke by defendants 
and therefore represents an adjustment of the law considerably more in favour of 
freedom of speech and against protection of reputation than than in Australia. Secondly, 
the Australian result is justified upon implied rights found in the Constitution Act, 
however, New Zealand has no equivalent Act nor has the New Zealand accorded 
superior constitutional status to such rights. Even the rights specifically stated in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act have not been given the superior the constitutional 
status of the Australian implied rights relied upon in ABC. 
2 Harrison v Banks 
In August 1997 Paterson J was required to decide whether the defence of qualified 
privilege applied to allegations against Mr Noel Harrison, at the material time head of 
the Northland Polytechnic, of roll-rigging and financial mismanagement made by Mr 
John Banks MP and published in the Northern Advocate newspaper. 
The defendants argued that the law of qualified privilege "has now moved on as is 
indicated in"149 Lange and ABC and that the facts in Harrison should fall within the 
147 Above n 8, 33. 
148 Above n 8, 33. 
149 Above n 9, 5 and 6. 
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types of occasion of political speech protected by the expanded qualified privilege 
defence. 
The defences proposed in Lange and ABC both contemplated the possibility of 
including the public conduct of public officials falling within the ambit of protected 
political discussion. In Harrison Paterson J held: 150 
Notwithstanding the extension of the boundaries as suggested in Lange v Atkinson and 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, I am of the view that in the 
circumstances of this case the defence of qualified privilege is not available to either 
defendant. This was not one of those exceptional cases where the law has recognised an 
interest or duty to publish defamatory matter to the general public ....... There was no 
duty in such circumstances to make, what the jury has held to be defamatory 
statements, to the wider public. 
Although Paterson J noted the differences between the case before him and cases 
involving information enabling electors to make their choice in a national election, 151 the 
decision in Harrison is significant for its reading down of the scope of political 
discussion occasions which will be protected from defamation liability. Harrison is also 
notable I suggest for the tendency by Paterson J to prefer the Australian formulation of 
the expanded defence in ABC with its requirement of reasonableness. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The significant change to the law of defamation heralded by the decision in Lange has 
been justified in terms of the noble aspirations of recognising rights of 152 "participation 
in government" and "rights fundamental to the democratic process". I have argued that 
the status quo represented an appropriate balance of these important principles with the 
countervailing principles of protection of reputation and maintenance of standards of 
integrity in the quality of political discourse. In any event if the time has come to 
enhance the public's rights of participation in government the appropriate means by 
150 Above n 9, 9. 
151 Above n 9, 10. 
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which this may be achieved is an issue of policy for Parliament. The judgment that 
freeing political discussion from the constraints of potential defamation liability will 
enhance the quality of the democratic process is one of pure policy. 
In closing, it is well to dwell for a moment on the concept of "freedom" in the context of 
public participation in the democratic process. I can do no better than to refer to Lord 
Radcliffe's expression of his concern at: 153 
.. . the extent to which modern usage has perverted the true meaning of freedom, 
by stressing so constantly its merely negative aspect. To the mood of the day, to 
which the complex and the inhibition, tension and self-control, are scourges 
more fearful than were Sin and the Black Death to our curious ancestors, it 
seems to be enough to resent and reject all external control, and then all grace 
will be added to you. That is little but escapism, a sort of Beatnik political 
philosophy and it is unworthy of that larger spirit of earlier days when such 
words as liberty and freedom meant a positive claim to displace outside 
authority by the more arduous responsibility of ordering oneself. 
Will the new freedom of political discussion truly enhance the democratic process in 
New Zealand or is it the dawn of a charter for scandal mongering? 
152 Above n 5, 43 and 45 . 
153 Above n 68, 226. 
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Getting What You 
Order 
FORMER LEADERS HAVE a bad lubit of 
hanging around to nuke a nuisance of 
themselves. Sir Rohen Muldoon did it to 
both Jim Mcl..ay and Jim Bolger, hounding 
the former out of politics and causing a suc-
cession of difficulties for the latter. But with 
the rise of political commenwy and the 
commercial speaker's circuit giving plat-
forms and financial incentives to the 
de osed. this perennial problem is getting 
worse. Hden Clark is currently ass.ailed by 
no lc:ss than three former leaders. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer doesn't me:m to 
ouse trouble. but he is regularly in the 
public spotlight, which makes him a for-
midable presence co be acknowledged. 
Mike Moore has done his very best to 
cause trouble but is still dithering about 
how to admiruster the most telling blow. 
So the immediate problem for Clark is her 
old friend David Lange, who has lately 
taken co pronouncing tendentiously on any 
number of issues: New Zeabnd troop {o 
deployments in Bosnia, the ideological 
character of the parliamentary Labour 
Party. the selection ofhis successor in Man-
gere, the New Zealand response to French 
nuclear testing, and so on. 
Former leaders are often anxious to 
make out that they could do the job better 
than their successors. David Lange is no. 
exce tion here. but his willin ess to re-
wnte lustorv in doing so is reminiscent of 
stav ut. rather than one who 
over the countrv - as i he'd alwavs been 
there when the needed him! · 
Cartoonist Tom Scott caught the 
shameless casuistry in one of Lange· s com-
ments wt year when he picrured the for-
mer PM lying in a hospital bed thnked by 
two doctors in white coats. The doctors 
look intently at the patient, shiling their 
heads, as one says to the other: "W 6rst case 
of false-memory syndrome I've ever seen." 
Daruel Defoe. WITH HIS IMPRESSIVE physical presence. 
Lange talks now as though he stood prodigious brain and extraordinary verbal 
alone a dexterity, Lange possesses many of the 
his attack of social conscience was a belated attributes of greamess. His command of the 
one. He talks as though he invented New rhetoric of moral outrage in his Oxford 
Zealand's anti-nuclear policv, when in Union debate with the Reverend Jerry Fal-
truth his conversion was somewhat reluc- well deservedly won him (and New 
t:int. He talks as though he actually deserves Zealand) global plaudits, but the finish has 
,___th_e-media-awarded mantle of internaconal not been worthy of the scan. Perlups it 
5 
scatesmanslup, when in fact he handled the never is, but with Lange the gap between 
issue of nuclear-ship visits with the finesse promise and performance is wider than 
of a skateboarding hippo. usual. 
Having himself showboated with the It has a~':Yays been so apparently. 
French over the Rainbou, Wamorand being Nobodv l'v~·spoken to who knew Lange 
forced to back down over imprisonment of;J · at school or universirv _reckons that h_e 
the convicted agents. he now has the 7 worked arccularlv hard m those davs. His 
effroncerv to cnncise others for nd- brilliance is freely acknowledged. but with 
scandino on Moruroa. His charge that the the common caveat that it was flashy and 
parliamencarv Libour Party is more con- just slightly oversold. A more inappropriate 
servaave now than 1t wa~ under his own minister of education would be hard to 
leadership is breathtaking in its audacity. find, for he aopeared to despise his teachers 
SimiJarlv. in rrving to a ooint !us own sue- and thev somecmes resented !um. thmkin 
cessor m Mano-en:. he cheekilv su _ests,a he wasn ·c at school to learn. but to show 
that tht' electorate needs an MP who will _t) off. 
.u Nonn & Soum 
Lawyers nuke a distinction between 
admired colleagues who have mastered dif-
ficult areas of law and courtroom actors 
who know less law but are lightning quick 
on their feet. David Lange was one of the 
larter. His speciality was the plea in micg:i-
tion for guilty but indigent clients. Picking 
up leg:i.l aid briefs shortly before his clients 
were due in coun, he improvised defences 
~t poor odds, and when the inevitable 
verdict was handed down he did a brilliant 
job of explaining why the normal penalty 
ought to be reduced. 
He was a su erb legal aid barrister. 
morallv cornmirted to his haoless clients a 
but bv all accounts less than fullv commit- I 
tcd to the profession he practised. And as 
with his teachers, there was the barest hint 
of disdain in his manner, as if conceding 
more than minor effon on his part might 
reduce him to their level. 
Lange carried this dilettantish guise into 
the political arena. His rise was meteonc. 
but his appetite for the bartle was alw.ivs 
slightly suspect. It is hard to say how mu~h 
his health problems lud to do with this, 
though when standing down as prime rrun-
ister on August 7 1989 he assured the press 
that poor health was not a conclusive fie-
tor in his decision. 
A retrospective look at a transcript of 
that final press conference nukes interest-
ing reading. for some of his answers are a f 
lot funnier now than he could pomblv ;. 
have intended them to be at the cme. f 
When asked. for instance. what he 
/0 
ii 
---. ...... - ........................................................ d_ .. _.-.._._-· -· ...... _ 
w:i.nted to do :i.s :i. backbencher, Lange miss. :i.nd there's locs of things .that you're 
responded fuceciously: "Well, I won't be :i. gl:i.d you did, :i.nd locs of things you don't 
politicJJ columnise." He w:i.s J.lso :i.sked fed like." "Like what?" someone insisted. 
wh:i.t he would miss most in his old job. The final reply w:i.s vintage Lange: "I don't 
:i.nd h: made three evasive replies. e:ich know whether you've ever tried to order 
one ot them lil:ldvenently revealing. breakfut in :i. New Zeal.:i.nd hotel," he said, 
The first thing he said he'd miss was J.z''buc I h:i.ve yet to gee one that I ordered." 
"press conferences". Everybody Laughed. Agam the laughter roared forth, detleccing, 
but never was :i. truer word spoken in jest. as it was me:int to, the chance of self-rev-
Lange had m0re obvious enthusi:i.sm for elation. Lange had won mdther round. 
prime ministeriJJ press conferences th:i.n And yet in :i. sense he h:i.d also lose the 
for any other aspect of his job. He relished battle, for wluc he hid from his audience. 
the contest because he won it easily. His perhaps even from himsel£ were his re:tl 
minders advised him to cut off reporters' re:i.sons for leaving: the truth was, he found 
questions :i.fter 15 minutes maximum, but the job too much like hard work. It was-
Lange w,ould amble out under the celevi- n 't just the hotel bre:ikfucs Lmge loathed. 
sion lighcs, with chest puffed out and hands but many other things about the role :is 
pushed down at his sides, like :i. boxer well. One of the crucial things he "didn't 
taunting his opponent to clce a shoe ac feel like" as prime minister, for inscnce, 
him. As the ineffectual queries pelted was in to meetin , includin cabinet 
down on him - seldom geccing close, / meetings which he habituallv lefr earlv. 
never hurting - the big man ducked :i.nd For whatever re:i.son - angina pams, 
weJved wich obvious gusto, drawing out boredom or some inner demon - he 
the bout for 20 minutes, 40 minutes, found it hard to sit scill and ofren rumed 
sometimes longer. His suff couldn' t get_ over the cabinet eh.air to G~ffrev P:tlmer 
him to stop . ii, while he :i.mbled otf co the toilet. to his 
Bue Jt the 1989 press conference, the ·, office. or even to the self-drive car which 
journalises pressed him Jg:i..in for J sacisfac- he liked to clce out for a recreJtional spin 
tory answer. Ap:i.rt from the press, wh.:it on the Wellington motorw:i.v: When his 
else would he miss? Lange now bec:i.me suff responded by having a c:i.r phone fie-
more obviously ev:i.sive, referring to him- /~ ted. he took it off the hook. He h.:is never 
self in the third person . "Oh." he re:illy grown up. 
responded, "there :ire locs of things you But he got J reJl kick out of press con-
ferences. public performances. rhetoncJJ 
pyrotechnics. It was the nitty-gnrty of pol-
itics he couldn't stand, the endless t:ice-to-
face wr:i.ngles :i.nd policy consulurions 
with people he thought boring or worse. 
HE SAW THE ENDS of politics so cle:idy 
but he couldn't sit scill long enough co !,FCC 
agreement on policy details. Th.:it must 
have been p:i.rt ofhis problem with Roger 
Douglas. It was J job he preferred to leave 
to others, JDd yet ic w:i.s J job that. :i.s 
leader, he had to do himself or it wouldn · t 
be effectively done. 
It must g:ill David Lange that several of 
those others, those inferior mechanics 
(Clark. Cullen :i.nd Caygill :i.mong them), 
arc now running the Labour P:ircy and 
doing J vastly better job of it than he w:i.s 
ever cJpable of doing. 
Th:it must be why he so often pucs them 
down. For if the fourth ubour govern-
ment under his Je:i.dership hJd been saving 
Jnd doing wh.:it ic IS now saying Jnd doing. 
it would surely noc have been so thor-
oughly discredited :i.mong its followers. 
She mJy not have Lmgc: ·s wic or 
genius, nor his effortless comnund of the 
popular media. but Helen Clark is vastly 
superior to him as a policy-m:i.ker Jnd 
party manager. I'll bet she J.lso h:i.s no trou-
ble geccing the bre:i.kfucs she orders m 
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The abo,-e btltf ohl11rnin, from Loil• 
don, )>ubllahtd 1.-terd111. dON not oon· 
nr much to the p,.._.nt d17 c•nerstlon 
of t.he Non1M ltat.i. t'ArHl' •hlcll · lllo• 
hd In the l"'lrllt.llo' attn~· 111 tht Old 
C:ountr1 from JW to JIIM, 1th-,r lie .n, 
at th• htlaht of hi. fa.ant, Jle •11 -of 
unique P"rM1nallt7 nd tht Jllrtlrlpator 
In ru&J17 atlrrlor ,W .!l1t,· 111o:9t of ' ,rhloh 
he W'OI\, • • • ... • : • . : •. : 
· No one who witls"9fld lht Jnlb\lo•'ap. 
J>t'UAll<'IN at, llece would. a"'°rdlq ~ 
llt1nr1 l>ow11 .. lUI .. In a 11'orll: d•U11r 
11·llh the bl,tory ol lJritl•h bcw•r. dlt-
put.e t.hat be. wae .onll of .lht oleftr"t 
and ,martut ud moll Nilfal paalll•h 
thL .. .r ~od: bull lll · tba 1'-foot 
rln,r,· Uad h, aps,eaNd, at u · .. ,11,r 
per~ lh&ll Uie l&tttr da1.9 ol the faJllnr 
and morlbuod prlH _ rl11i, ~ a11d bcl h• 
ch«-11 hon•tl1 to ,nffl hit 'po_,,_ ' Uie 
fem• t.b.t accompe11!1d ' lbt otiamplo~ 
~hlpe of Jem Belcher and J,•ni. \\'u-d 
wiirlit al.o ba,., ,h.me 011 1'1111, 'rhe 
rlt1ir, bo11·e•tr, bad falltn ' nto d"&nttJa. 
tlon 11·b111 llao., lirat ~arnt kr.twn .. a 
bo:rer and It wu to thi, tuat ,: n-1 cf the 
"ahady'' lndJ,nt, of hie . ttartot aolaht 
be 1ACribcd,' , •, ;, , , ",' • • · • , ' ·: .. I 
· ·. · ~ , .. uni ·.AS ··A.sRowu.,~. · 1;! ' 
Born at n-toa.- near Rw-atrha~, : II\ · 
Xorfolk, in ~II\T 1831, he tint came UD• I 
dtt (ltrulie uoace ... proprietor ot a 
• ~alrt, race 
I he pl•J• 
ment, and 
r-,, .'beln,c 
l...or, · He 
iw111an hn• 
Mtrt of ad. 
l1&ct .IOCII 
.. and 111<· 
DC: • 7oltel1 .' 
t. ' b,· • ._. 
... rtr u-
Ml with the 
. 11htt ,rlth 



